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ABSTRACT
Su, Dong PhD, Purdue University, December 2016. Differentially Private Data Publishing
for Data Analysis. Major Professor: Ninghui Li.
In the information age, vast amounts of sensitive personal information are collected by
companies, institutions and governments. A key technological challenge is how to design
mechanisms for effectively extracting knowledge from data while preserving the privacy of
the individuals involved. In this dissertation, we address this challenge from the perspec-
tive of differentially private data publishing. Firstly, we propose PrivPfC, a differentially
private method for releasing data for classification. The key idea underlying PrivPfC is
to privately select, in a single step, a grid, which partitions the data domain into a num-
ber of cells. This selection is done using the exponential mechanism with a novel quality
function, which maximizes the expected number of correctly classified records by a his-
togram classifier. PrivPfC supports both the binary classification as well as the multiclass
classification. Secondly, we study the problem of differentially private k-means clustering.
We develop techniques to analyze the empirical error behaviors of the existing interactive
and non-interactive approaches. Based on the analysis, we propose an improvement of the
DPLloyd algorithm which is a differentially private version of the Lloyd algorithm and pro-
pose a non-interactive approach EUGkM which publishes a differentially private synopsis
for k-means clustering. We also propose a hybrid approach that combines the advantages
of the improved version of DPLloyd and EUGkM. Finally, we investigate the sparse vec-
tor technique (SVT) which is a fundamental technique for satisfying differential privacy in
answering a sequence of queries. We propose a new version of SVT that provides better
utility by introducing an effective technique to improve the performance of SVT in the in-
teractive setting. We also show that in the non-interactive setting (but not the interactive
setting), usage of SVT can be replaced by the exponential mechanism.
11. INTRODUCTION
Data collected by organizations and agencies are a key resource in today’s information
age. The use of sophisticated data mining techniques makes it possible to extract relevant
knowledge that can then be used for a variety of purposes, such as research, product de-
velopment and public policy making. However, the disclosure and exploration of those
data pose serious threats to individual privacy. Examples include the identification of the
medical record of the governor of Massachusetts from the GIC data [1]; the identification
of the search history of an AOL user from the AOL query log data [2]; the identification of
Netflix subscribers from the Netflix Prize dataset [3] and the identification of participants
from the published aggregated DNA statistics in the Genome-Wide Association Studies
(GWAS) [4].
In this dissertation, we consider the problem of private data publication. In this setting,
a trusted data curator gathers sensitive information from a large number of respondents,
create a microdataset where each tuple corresponds to one entity, such an individual, a
household or an organization, and release the sanitized synopsis to the public.
In recent years, differential privacy [5, 6] has emerged as the de facto standard privacy
notion for private data analysis because it offers a rigorous guarantee of privacy regard-
less of the adversary’s prior knowledge. Differential privacy requires that the output of a
data analysis mechanism be approximately identical, even if any single tuple in the input
database is arbitrarily added or removed. Differential privacy is parameterized by ǫ, the
upper bound of the ratio of the probabilities on getting the same output on the above two
database differing in a single tuple. ǫ measures the privacy risk. The smaller the ǫ is, the
harder for the adversary to infer the existence of the target tuple in the database.
We aim at developing practical techniques to data analysis under differential privacy.
There are two broad approaches for differentially private data analysis. The interactive
approach aims at developing customized differentially private algorithms for various data
2analysis tasks. The non-interactive approach aims at developing differentially private algo-
rithms that can output a synopsis of the input dataset, which can then be used to support
various data mining tasks. Most of existing works focus on developing interactive ap-
proaches [7–12]. However, the interactive approach is far from being practical since the
limited privacy budget has to be shared by all queries issued to the database. On the other
hand, non-interactive approaches are free from this limitation. However, very few prac-
tical and accurate non-interactive private data publishing algorithms have been proposed.
Therefore, in this dissertation, we attempt to provide solutions for differentially private data
analysis by proposing new non-interactive algorithms and combining the advantages of two
approaches.
We begin in Chapter 3 by introducing PrivPfC, a differentially private method for re-
leasing data for classification. Several state-of-the-art methods follow the structure of ex-
isting classification algorithms and are all iterative, which is suboptimal due to the locally
optimal choices and division of the privacy budget among many sequentially composed
steps. We propose PrivPfC, a new differentially private method for releasing data for clas-
sification. The key idea underlying PrivPfC is to privately select, in a single step, a grid,
which partitions the data domain into a number of cells. This selection is done using the ex-
ponential mechanism with a novel quality function, which maximizes the expected number
of correctly classified records by a histogram classifier. PrivPfC supports both the binary
classification as well as the multiclass classification. Through extensive experiments on
real datasets, we demonstrate PrivPfC’s superiority over the state-of-the-art methods.
In Chapter 4, we focus on differentially private k-means clustering. Several state-of-
the-art methods follow the single-workload approach which adapts an existing machine
learning algorithm by making each step private. However, most of them do not have sat-
isfactory empirical performance. In this work, we develop techniques to analyze the em-
pirical error behaviors of one of the state-of-the-art single-workload approaches, DPLloyd,
which is a differentially private version of the Lloyd algorithm. Based on the analysis,
we propose an improvement of DPLloyd. We also propose a new algorithm for k-means
clustering from the perspective of the non-interactive approach which publishes a synopsis
3of the input dataset. After analyzing the empirical error behaviors of EUGkM, we further
propose a hybrid approach that combines our DPLloyd improvement and EUGkM. Re-
sults from extensive and systematic experiments support our analysis and demonstrate the
effectiveness of the DPLloyd improvement, EUGkM and the hybrid approach.
In Chapter 5, we focus on the sparse vector technique. The Sparse Vector Technique
(SVT) is a fundamental technique for satisfying differential privacy and has the unique
quality that one can output some query answers without apparently paying any privacy
cost. SVT has been used in both the interactive setting, where one tries to answer a se-
quence of queries that are not known ahead of the time, and in the non-interactive setting,
where all queries are known. Because of the potential savings on privacy budget, many
variants for SVT have been proposed and employed in privacy-preserving data mining and
publishing. However, most variants of SVT are actually not private. In this dissertation,
we analyze these errors and identify the misunderstandings that likely contribute to them.
We also propose a new version of SVT that provides better utility, and introduce an effec-
tive technique to improve the performance of SVT. These enhancements can be applied to
improve utility in the interactive setting. In the non-interactive setting (but not the interac-
tive setting), usage of SVT can be replaced by the Exponential Mechanism (EM); we have
conducted analytical and experimental comparisons to demonstrate that EM outperforms
SVT.
Our overall contribution can be summarized as follows. On differentially private classi-
fication, we propose a non-interactive approach for publishing projected histograms, which
results in lower classification error when compared with the current state-of-the-art meth-
ods. On differentially private k-means clustering, we propose the EUGkM method for
publishing synopsis for k-means clustering, which outperforms existing methods. We also
propose a novel hybrid approach to differentially private data analysis, which is so far the
best approach to k-means clustering. On SVT, we propose a new version of it that provides
better utility, and introduce an effective technique to improve the performance of SVT in
the interactive setting. We also showed that in the non-interactive setting, usage of SVT
can be replaced by the Exponential Mechanism (EM).
42. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATEDWORKS
2.1 The Definition of ǫ-DP
Informally, the DP notion requires any single element in a dataset to have only a limited
impact on the output. The following definition is taken from [5, 6].
Definition 2.1.1 (ǫ-Differential Privacy) An algorithm A satisfies ǫ-differential privacy
(ǫ-DP), where ǫ ≥ 0, if and only if for any datasets D and D′ that differ on one element,
we have
∀T ⊆Range(A) : Pr [A(D) ∈ T ] ≤ eǫ Pr [A(D′) ∈ T ] , (2.1)
where Range(A) denotes the set of all possible outputs of the algorithmA.
The condition (2.1) can be equivalently stated as:
∀t ∈Range(A) : Pr [A(D) = t]
Pr [A(D′) = t] ≤ e
ǫ, (2.2)
where we define 0
0
to be 1.
More generally, ǫ-DP can be defined by requiring Eq. (2.1) to hold on D and D′ that
are neighboring. When applying DP, an important choice is the precise condition under
which D and D′ are considered to be neighboring. Even when applying DP to relational
datasets and interpreting “differing by one element” as “differing by a single record (or
tuple)”, there are still two natural choices, which lead to what are called unbounded and
bounded DP in [13]. In Unbounded DP, D and D′ are neighboring if D can be obtained
from D′ by adding or removing one element. In Bounded DP, D and D′ are neighboring
if D can be obtained from D′ by replacing one element in D′ with another element. When
using bounded DP, two datasets that have different number of elements are not considered
to be neighboring; therefore, publishing the exact number of elements in the input dataset
5satisfies ǫ-DP for any ǫ under bounded DP. However, doing so does not satisfy ǫ-DP for any
ǫ in unbounded DP.
One way to understand the intuition of DP is the following “opting-out” analogy. We
want to publishA(D), whereD consists of data of many individuals. An individual objects
to publishing A(D) because her data is in D and she is concerned about her privacy. In
this case, we can address the individual’s privacy concern by removing her data fromD (or
replacing her data with some arbitrary value) to obtainD′ and publishingA(D′). However,
achieving privacy protection by removing an individual’s data is infeasible. Since we need
to protect everyone’s privacy, following this approach means that we would need to remove
everyone’s data. DP tries to approximate the effect of opting out, by ensuring that any effect
due to the inclusion of one’s data is small. This is achieved by ensuring that for any output,
one will see the same output with a similar probability even if any single individual’s data
is removed (unbounded DP), or replaced (bounded DP).
2.1.1 Bounded DP or Unbounded DP
In the literature, it is generally assumed that using either bounded or unbounded DP
is fine, and one can choose whichever one that is more convenient. We point out, how-
ever, that using bounded DP is problematic. More specifically, as we show in Section 2.2,
bounded DP does not compose under parallel composition (whereas unbounded DP does).
This parallel composition property is often used when proving that an algorithm satisfies
ǫ-DP.
We also note that any algorithm that satisfies ǫ-unbounded DP also satisfies (2ǫ)-
bounded DP, since replacing one element with another can be achieved by removing one
element and then adding the other. Therefore, we use unbounded DP in this book.
2.2 Properties of ǫ-DP
DP is an appealing privacy notion in part because it has the following nice properties.
These properties are very useful when designing multi-step algorithms that satisfy ǫ-DP.
62.2.1 Post-processing and Sequential Composition
One important property of ǫ-DP is that given an algorithm that satisfies ǫ-DP, no matter
what additional processing one performs on the output of the algorithm, the composition
of the algorithm and the post-processing step still satisfies ǫ-DP.
Proposition 2.2.1 (Post-processing) Given A1(·) that satisfies ǫ-DP, then for any (pos-
sibly randomized) algorithm A2, the composition of A1 and A2, i.e., A2(A1(·)) satisfies
ǫ-DP.
Proof Let D and D′ be any two neighboring databases. Let S be Range(A1). For any
t ∈ Range(A2), we have
Pr [A2(A1(D)) = t)] =
∑
s∈S




eǫPr [A1(D′) = s]Pr [A2(s) = t]
= eǫPr [A2(A1(D′)) = t] .
If S is not countable, Pr [A2(A1(D)) = t)] =
∫
s∈S Pr [A1(D) = s]Pr [A2(s) = t] ds and
the logic of the proof is the same.
In the above proposition, the post-processing algorithm A2 accesses only the output of
A1 and not the input dataset D. The following proposition applies to the case where A2
also accesses D.
Proposition 2.2.2 (Sequential composition) Given A1(·) that satisfies ǫ1-DP, and
A2(s, ·) that satisfies ǫ2-DP for any s, then A(D) = A2(A1(D), D) satisfies (ǫ1 + ǫ2)-
DP.
7Proof Let D and D′ be any two neighboring databases. Let S be Range(A1). For any
t ∈ Range(A2), we have
Pr [A2(A1(D), D) = t)] =
∑
s∈S




eǫ1Pr [A1(D′) = s] eǫ2Pr [A2(s,D′) = t]
= eǫ1+ǫ2Pr [A2(A1(D′), D′) = t] .
If S is not countable, Pr [A2(A1(D), D) = t)] =
∫
s∈S Pr [A1(D) = s]Pr [A2(s,D) = t] ds
and the logic of the proof is the same.
Note that Proposition 2.2.1 is a special case of Proposition 2.2.2, where A2 satisfies
0-DP because it does not look at the input dataset. Proposition 2.2.2 can be further gener-
alized to the case where there are k such algorithms, each taking two inputs, an auxiliary
input consisting of the combined outputs of the previous algorithms, and the input dataset,
and satisfying ǫ-DP when the auxiliary input is fixed.
Corollary 1 (General Sequential Composition) Let A1,A2, · · · ,Ak be k algorithms
(that take auxiliary inputs) that satisfy ǫ1-DP, ǫ2-DP, · · · , ǫk-DP, respectively, with respect
to the input dataset. Publishing




This follows from Proposition 2.2.2 via mathematical induction. The ǫ parameter is
often referred to as the “privacy budget”, since it needs to be divided under sequential
composition and consumed by individual steps in an algorithm.
82.2.2 Parallel Composition and Convexity
We now consider another form of composition, where k algorithms are applied to an
input dataset D, but each algorithm only to a portion of D. We introduce the notion of
a partitioning function. Let D denote the set of all possible data items. A partitioning
algorithm f takes an item inD as input and maps it to a positive integer number. Executing
f on D once yields a partitioning of D as follows. One executes f on each element of D,
each time resulting in a number. Let k be the largest number being outputted, then D is
partitioned into k partitions, withDi including all items mapped to i.
Proposition 2.2.3 (Parallel Composition under Unbounded DP.) Let A1,A2, · · · ,Ak
be k algorithms that satisfy ǫ1-DP, ǫ2-DP, · · · , ǫk-DP, respectively. Given a deterministic
partitioning function f , let D1, D2, · · · , Dk be the resulting partitions of executing f on
D. PublishingA1(D1),A2(D2), · · · ,Ak(Dk) satisfies (maxi∈[1,..,k] ǫi)-DP.
Proof Given two neighboring datasets D and D′, without loss of generality, assume
that D contains one more element than D′. Let the result of partitioning of D and
D′ be D1, D2, · · · , Dk and D′1, D′2, · · · , D′k, respectively. There exists j such that (1)
Dj contains one more element than D
′
j , and (2) for any i 6= j, Di = D′i. Denote
A1(D1),A2(D2), · · · ,Ak(Dk) by A(D). Since these k algorithms run on disjoint sets
Di independently, for any sequence t = (t1, t2, · · · , tk) of outputs of these k algorithms,
where ti ∈ Range(Ai), we have
Pr [A(D) = t] = Pr [(A1(D1) = t1) ∧ (A2(D2) = t2) ∧ · · · ∧ (Ak(Dk) = tk)] .
= Pr [Aj(Dj) = tj ]
∏
i 6=j
Pr [Ai(Di) = ti]
≤ eǫjPr [Aj(D′j) = tj]∏
i 6=j
Pr [Ai(D′i) = ti]
≤ emaxi∈[1,..,k] ǫiPr [A(D′) = t] .
9Example 1 (Publishing histograms based on counts.) Suppose that we have a method to
publish the number of records in a set while satisfying ǫ-DP. We can use the parallel
composition to turn that method into one for publishing a histogram. A histogram “bins”
the range of values, i.e., divides the entire range of values into a series of intervals, and
then counts how many values fall into each interval.
Recall that publishing the total number of records in a dataset satisfies 0-DP under the
bounded DP interpretation. Thus, if parallel composition were to hold for bounded DP as
well, then arbitrary histograms can be published accurately while satisfying 0-DP.
Proposition 2.2.4 Parallel composition does not hold using the bounded DP interpreta-
tion.
Proof When one element in a datasetD is replaced by another element to obtainD′, after
partitioningD andD′, we may be in the situation that there exist i 6= j such tatDi contains
one additional element than D′i, and D
′




can be unbounded because Di and D
′
i contain different numbers of
elements.
Since parallel composition is frequently used to prove that an algorithm satisfies ǫ-DP,
Proposition 2.2.4 suggests that we should use the unbounded interpretation of ǫ-DP wher-
ever possible. If bounded DP is used, one has to be really careful that parallel composition
is not used.
Proposition 2.2.3 is only for the case where the partition function f is deterministic. To
prove that it also holds when f is randomized, the following convexity property of DP is
helpful.
Proposition 2.2.5 (Convexity) Given two mechanisms A1 and A2 that both satisfy ǫ-DP,
and any p ∈ [0, 1], let A be the mechanism that applies A1 with probability p and A2 with
probability 1− p. Then A satisfies ǫ-DP.
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Proof Let D and D′ be any two neighboring databases. For any t ∈ Range(A), we have
Pr [A(D) = t] = pPr [A1(D) = t] + (1− p)Pr [A2(D) = t]
≤ p eǫ Pr [A1(D′) = t] + (1− p) eǫ Pr [A2(D′) = t]
= eǫ (pPr [A1(D′) = t] + (1− p)Pr [A2(D′) = t])
= eǫPr [A(D′) = t] .
Again, we can generalize the above to the case of k algorithms.
Corollary 2 (Convexity: General Case) Given k mechanisms A1,A2, · · · ,Ak that sat-
isfy ǫ-DP, and p1, p2, · · · , pk ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑k
i=1 pi = 1, let A be the mechanism that
applies Ai with probability pi. Then A satisfies ǫ-DP.
This follows from Proposition 2.2.5 by mathematical induction. With this corollary, we
can extend the parallel composition to the case of randomized partition function as well.
Note that we require that such a partitioning function f to have an upper-bound on the
number of partitions it produces, i.e., there exists b such that ∀x, f(x) ≤ b.
Proposition 2.2.6 (Parallel composition, Randomized partition function.) Let
A1,A2, · · · ,Ak be k algorithms that satisfy ǫ1-DP, ǫ2-DP, · · · , ǫk-DP, respectively.
Given a possibly randomized partitioning function f , The mechanism of first execut-
ing f on D, with D1, D2, · · · , Dk being the resulting partitions, and then publishing
A1(D1),A2(D2), · · · ,Ak(Dk), satisfies (maxi∈[1,..,k] ǫi)-DP.
Proof Let ǫ = maxi∈[1,..,k] ǫi. We can view the result of f as a probabilistic combination of
many deterministic partitioning functions. Consider all possible outputs of f on elements
in D. The total number of such combinations is finite. Let fi be the partitioning function
that output the i’th such output, and pi be the probably that executing f results in output
fi. From Proposition 2.2.3, the parallel composition under fi satisfies ǫ-DP. The behavior
under f can be viewed as the convex composition of all fi’s, and thus also satisfies ǫ-DP
because of Corollary 2.
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2.3 The Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism ( [5]) is the first and probably most widely used mechanism
for DP. It satisfies ǫ-DP by adding noise to the output of a numerical function. We present
first the case where the function outputs a scalar, and then the vector case. We present them
separately even though the latter subsumes the former as a special case, because the scalar
case is easier to understand.
2.3.1 The Scalar Case
Assume that we have a dataset for patients diagnosed with lung cancer, with one at-
tribute being how many years the patient has been smoking, and another being how many
packs of cigarette the patient smokes on average per day. Suppose that we want to know
how many patients have been smoking for more than 15 years, how to obtain the answer
while satisfying ǫ-DP?
In this case, we want to compute f(D), where f outputs a single scalar value. To satisfy
ǫ-DP, one can publish f˜(D) = f(D)+X , whereX is a random variable drawn from some
distribution. What distribution should one use for X? Intuitively, we want the distribution










] = Pr [f(D) +X = t]
Pr [f(D′) +X ′ = t]
=
Pr [X = t− f(D)]
Pr [X ′ = t− f(D′)] ≤ e
ǫ,
whereX andX ′ are drawn from the same distribution. Let d = f(D)− f(D′), we need to
ensure that
∀x, Pr [X = x]
Pr [X ′ = x+ d]
≤ eǫ. (2.3)
We need to ensure that Eq. (2.3) holds for all possible d, and thus need the concept of
the global sensitivity of f , which is the maximum change of f between two neighboring
datasetsD and D′.
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Definition 2.3.1 (Global sensitivity) Let D ≃ D′ denote that D and D′ are neighboring.




We want to ensure that Eq. (2.3) holds for all d ≤ ∆f . In other words, the probability
density function of the noise should have the property that if one moves no more than ∆f
units on the x-axis, the probability should increase or decrease by a factor of no more than
eǫ, i.e., if one moves no more than 1 unit on the x-axis, the probability should change by a
multiplicative factor of no more than eǫ/∆f .





, the Laplace dis-
tribution, where Pr [Lap (β) = x] = 1
2β
e−|x|/β. Note that
Pr [Lap (β) = x]
Pr [Lap (β) = x+ d]














Figure 2.1.: Differential privacy via Laplace noise.
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Theorem 2.3.1 (Laplace mechanism, scalar case) For any function f , the Laplace mech-

























Pr [Af(D) = t]






















The first inequality holds because of the Triangle inequality with absolute value |a| − |b| ≤
|a− b| and the second holds due to Eq. (2.4).
Example 2 (Counting Queries) Queries such as “how many patients have been smoking
for more than 15 years” are counting queries, as they count how many records satisfy
a given condition. In general, counting queries have global sensitivity 1, as adding or
removing a single record can change the result of a counting query by at most 1. They can
thus be answered by the Laplace mechanism with relatively low noises.
Example 3 (Sum Queries) Queries summing up the values of one attribute for the records
that satisfy a given condition have sensitivity that equals the size of the domain of that
attribute, and can be answered by the Laplace mechanism.
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2.3.2 The Vector Case
The Laplace mechanism can also be applied to a function f that outputs a vector, in
which case, the global sensitivity ∆f is the maximum L1 norm of the difference between




And noise calibrated to the global sensitivity should be added to all components of a vector.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Laplace mechanism, the vector case) The Laplace mechanism for a
function f whose value is a k-dimensional vector, defined below, satisfies ǫ-DP.
Af(D) = f(D) + 〈X1, X2, · · · , Xk〉,






Proof Suppose f(D) = 〈a1, a2, · · · , ak〉. For any output t = 〈t1, t2, · · · , tk〉,
Pr [Af(D) = t] = Pr [f(D) + 〈X1, X2, · · · , Xk〉 = t]















































Pr [Af(D) = t]





















≤ exp (ǫ) .
The first inequality holds because of the triangle inequality for the L1-norm and the second
holds due to Eq. (2.5).
Example 4 (Histogram) Consider again the dataset for patients diagnosed with lung can-
cer, with one attribute being how many years the patient has been smoking, and another
being how many packs of cigarette the patient smokes on average per day. We can pub-
lish a one-dimensional histogram that counts how many patients have been smoking for
a certain number of years, where the number of years is divided into a few bins, such as
{[0 − 4], [5 − 9], [10 − 14], [15 − 19], [20 − 29], [30+]}. Publishing such a histogram has
global sensitivity 1, since adding or removing one patient changes only the count of one





added to each bin count satisfies ǫ-DP.
Similarly, we can publish a two-dimensional histogram that also considers how many
packs of cigarettes a patient smoke on average per day. The same Laplace mechanism
would apply. Note that to satisfy ǫ-DP, it is important that the way the attribute values are
partitioned into bins does not depend on the input dataset. If the partitioning depends on
the input dataset, one has to ensure that the partitioning and the histogram together satisfy
ǫ-DP, using composition properties in Section 2.2.
Note the the above noisy Histogram method can be viewed either as applying the
Laplace mechanism with a vector output, or as a parallel composition of the counting func-
tion.
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2.4 The Exponential Mechanism
While the Laplace mechanism provides a solution to handle numeric queries, it cannot
be applied to non-numeric valued queries. This motivates the development of the expo-
nential mechanism [14], which can be applied whether a function’s output is numerical or
categorical.
Suppose that one wants to publish f(D), and let O denote the set of possible outputs.
To satisfy ǫ-DP, a mechanism should output values in O following some probability dis-
tribution. Naturally, some values in O are more desirable than others. For example, the
most desirable output is the true value f(D), and one has natural preferences among other
values as well. For example, consider a transactional dataset D, and one wants to output
the item that appears most frequently in D. Then O is the set of all items, and between
two items, we prefer to output the one that appears more often. This preference is encoded
using a quality function q : (D × O) → R, where D denotes the set of all datasets, and
R denotes the set of all real numbers. Without loss of generality, we assume that a higher
quality value indicates better utility. For example, in the most frequent item case, a natural
choice is to define q(D, o) to be the number of times the item o appears inD.
2.4.1 The General Case of the Exponential Mechanism
Definition 2.4.1 (The Exponential Mechanism) For any quality function q : (D× O)→
R, and a privacy parameter ǫ, the exponential mechanism Mǫq(D) outputs o ∈ O with








|q(D, o)− q(D′, o)|
is the sensitivity of the quality function. That is,
Pr












Theorem 2.4.1 (The Exponential Mechanism) The exponential mechanism satisfies ǫ-
differential privacy.































[Mǫq(D′) = o] =














































































2.4.2 The Monotonic Case of the Exponential Mechanism
In some usages of the exponential mechanism, the quality function q(D, o) is mono-
tonic in the sense that for any D and D′ that are neighboring, either ∀o ∈ O, q(D, o) ≥
q(D′, o), or ∀o ∈ O, q(D, o) ≤ q(D′, o). This is generally the case when the quality func-
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tion is based on counting the number of records satisfying some condition. For example,
this is the case when applying the exponential mechanism to frequent itemsets mining. For
such quality functions, the effectiveness of the exponential mechanism can be improved.
One can make more accurate selections by choosing each possible output with probability
proportional to exp( ǫq(D,t)
∆q
), instead of exp( ǫq(D,t)
2∆q
). To see that doing so satisfies ǫ-DP,
observe that Eq. (2.7) of the proof is a product of two terms, and for a monotonic quality
function, whenever the first term is ≥ 1, the second term is ≤ 1; thus upper-bounding the
first term by eǫ suffices. See below for details.
The utility benefit of doing is this is equivalent to doubling the privacy budget ǫ. Sup-
pose that under the general Exponential Mechanism, the odds of choosing the best option
relative to another less preferable one is 10 : 1, then under the monotonic Exponential
Mechanism, the odds is square to become 100 : 1.
Corollary 3 For any monotonic quality function q : (D×O)→ R and a privacy parameter
ǫ, the exponential mechanism Mǫq(D) outputting o ∈ O with probability proportional to
eǫq(D,o)/(∆q) satisfies ǫ-DP.
Proof Let D and D′ be two neighboring datasets. Without loss of generality, assume
D′ = D ∪ {r} and the quality function q(D, o) is monotonically increasing when the size
























Now we turn to the privacy proof of the exponential mechanism in the same way as the
proof above.
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 = exp (ǫ).




























≤ exp (ǫ) · 1 = exp (ǫ).




≤ eǫ and thus the corollary holds.
2.5 Settings to Apply DP
We classify DP mechanisms into the following four settings.
1. Local Privacy. In this setting, there is no trusted third party, and each participant
perturbs and submits personal data. To apply DP here, one requires that for two
arbitrary possible input x1 and x2, and any output y: Pr [y|x1] ≤ eǫPr [y|x2].
2. Interactive query-answering. For this and the remaining settings, there is a trusted
data curator who has access to raw data. In the interactive setting, the data curator sits
between the users and the database, and answers queries when they are submitted,
without knowing what queries will be asked in the future.
3. Single workload. In this setting, there is a single data analysis task one wants to
perform on the dataset. Example tasks include learning a classifier, finding k cluster
centroids of the data, and so on. The data curator performs the analysis task in a
private way, and publishes the result.
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4. Noninteractive publishing. In this setting the curator publishes a synopsis of the input
dataset, from which a broad class of queries can be answered and synthetic data can
be generated.
Note that the latter three settings all require a trusted data curator.
Local Privacy. The local privacy setting is closely related to randomized response [15],
which is a decades-old technique in social science to collect statistical information about
embarrassing or illegal behavior. To report a single bit, one reports the true value with
probability p and the flip of the true value with probability 1 − p. In a sense, applying the
DP requirement here can be viewed as a generalization of the property from randomized
response to a case where one report a non-binary value.
The Interactive Setting. In this setting, the data curator does not know ahead of time what
queries will be encountered, and answers queries as they come. One simple method is to
divide up the privacy budget and consume a portion of the privacy budget to answer each
query [16]. More sophisticated methods (e.g., [17–19]) maintain a history of past queries
and answers, and try to use the history to answer new queries whenever the error of doing
so is acceptable.
Using the interactive setting in practice, however, has several challenges. First and
foremost, answering each query consumes a portion of privacy budget, and after the privacy
budget is exhausted, no additional queries can be answered on the data without violating
DP. Second, the interactive setting is unsuitable with more than one data users. When
a dataset needs to serve the general public such as when the census bureau provides the
census data to the public, the number of data users is very large. Because the curator
cannot be sure whether any two data users are colluding or not, the privacy budget has to
be shared by all users. This means that only a few users can be supported and each user
can have only a small number of queries answered.
Single Workload. In this setting, the goal is to publish the result from one data min-
ing or machine learning task. Most approaches try to adapt an existing machine learning
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algorithm by making each step private. An alternative approaches include perturbing the
optimization objective function for learning a classifier.
Non-interactive publishing. In this setting, the data curator publishes some summary of
the data. It is generally assumed that the set of queries one cares about is known. The most
natural set of queries are histogram queries or marginal queries.
Interactive versus Non-interactive. There are a series of negative results concerning
differential privacy in the non-interactive mode [5, 20–23], and these results have been
interpreted “to mean that one cannot answer a linear, in the database size, number of queries
with small noise while preserving privacy” and motivate “an interactive approach to private
data analysis where the number of queries is limited to be small — sub-linear in the size n
of the dataset” [23]. However, these results are all based on query sets that are broader than
the natural set of queries that one is interested in. For example, suppose the dataset is one-
dimensional where each value is an integer number in [1..M ]. Further suppose that the data
is sufficiently dense, then publishing a histogram likely gives information that one wants
to know about the database. These negative results say that if one also consider subset sum
queries (i.e., the sum of an arbitrary set of indices in [1..m]), then not all queries can be
answered to a high accuracy. Intuitively this is true; however, it does not say much about
how accurately we can answer range queries.
2.6 Differentially Private Data Analysis
Many data mining and machine learning problems can be viewed as optimization prob-
lems. Examples include k-means clustering, regression, and classification. We use D to
denote the input dataset, ω∗ to denote the desired output, and J(D,ω) to denote the objec-
tive function to be minimized. That is, we want to output




Several interesting techniques have been developed to perform these optimization tasks
while satisfying DP. In this chapter, we group these techniques into the following cate-
gories.
1. Output Perturbation. One method is to directly perturb the output of the optimiza-
tion problem. This requires analyzing the sensitivity of the optimization problem;
that is, how much ω∗ changes when the input datasetD changes by one tuple. Unfor-
tunately, the sensitivities of these optimization problems tend to be so high that such
output perturbation destroys utility.
2. Objective Perturbation. There exists a class of methods unique to optimization
problems. Instead of perturbing the output of the optimization problem, one can
perturb the optimization objective function J(D,ω) to get J∗(D,ω) in a way such
that optimizing according to J∗(D,ω) is differentially private.
3. Making Existing Algorithms Private. Another method is to take an existing op-
timization algorithm and make each individual step that needs access to the input
dataset private.
4. Iterative Local Search. There exists another method is to perform an iterative local
search to approach ω∗. In each iteration, given the current candidate or candidates,
we can generate a pool of new candidates and use the exponential mechanism to
select among them.
5. Publishing Histograms for Optimization. Finally, one can publish a histogram
of D optimized for the purpose of the task, e.g., for clustering or for classification,
and then perform optimization using the histogram. Intuitively, this publishes more
information than needed for outputting ω∗; however, this appears to outperform the
above methods in experiments.
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2.6.1 Example Optimization Problems
We now give a brief description of the optimization problems that have been studied in
the context of differential privacy, and discuss the feasibility of performing output pertur-
bation for each of them.
k-means Clustering
k-means clustering is a widely used unsupervised machine learning method for data
analysis. It has a wide range of applications, including but not limited to nearest neighbor
queries, market segment, image processing, and geo-statistics.
The input is a dataset D = {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, where each data point xℓ is a d-
dimensional real vector. Intuitively, the dataset D consists of points in a d-dimensional
space. The output is a set of k points ω = {o1, o2, · · · , ok}, known as the centroids. These
k centroids partition D into k clusters such that each data point belongs to the cluster de-
fined by the centroid that is closest to the data point. (If there are more than one closest
centroids for a data point, the data point is assigned to one of the corresponding clusters.)
The objective function to be minimized is the within-cluster sum of squares. We normalize









||xℓ − oj||2. (2.8)
The standard k-means algorithm is the Lloyd’s algorithm ( [24]). The algorithm
starts by selecting k points as the initial choices for the centroid, and then tries to im-
prove these centroid choices iteratively until no improvement can be made. In each itera-
tion, one first uses the current centroid choices to partition the data points into k clusters
O = {O1, O2, · · · , Ok}, with each point assigned to the same cluster as the nearest cen-
troid. Then, one updates each centroid to be the center of the data points in the cluster.







where xℓi and o
j
i are the i-th dimension coordinates of x
ℓ and oj , respectively. The algorithm
continues by alternating between data partition and centroid update, until it converges.
The quality of the output computed by the Lloyd’s algorithm is subject to the choice
of the starting points. Random Partition and Forgy are two commonly adopted
initialization methods. The former randomly partitions the database into k clusters, and
takes the centers of the clusters as starting points. The latter randomly selects k data points
(seeds) from the database as the starting points. One can run the algorithm multiple times,
with different choices of initial centroids, and choose the output that has the minimal NICV.
The global sensitivity of k-means clustering problem is very high, as changing one
single data point could completely change the optimal clustering centroids; see [25].
Linear Regression
Linear regression is a fundamental statistical approach for modeling the linear relation-
ship between a dependent variable and several independent variables. It has been used
extensively in practical applications, including fitting prediction models and analyzing the
relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables.
The input is a dataset D = {〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, . . . , 〈xN , yN〉}, where xℓ is a d-
dimensional real vector, and yℓ is a real scalar value. The output is a d-dimensional vector













In other words, linear regression expresses the value of y as a linear function of the val-
ues of x1, . . . , xd, such that the sum of square errors of the predicted y values is minimized.
The global sensitivity of linear regression is unbounded. For example, given a dataset
where each x is one-dimensional with N − 1 points at (0, 0) and 1 point at (1/N, 0). The
optimal line y = 0x˙+0. Adding an additional point (1, N) to the input dataset results in an
optimal line y = Nx˙+ 0. Thus, adding noise to the line parameter according to the global
sensitivity remove all utilities completely.
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Logistic Regression
Logistic regression also learns a vector of linear coefficients; however, the inner prod-
uct of these coefficients and a data point’s independent variables is used to estimate the
probability of the dependent variable, using the logistic function.
The input is a dataset D = {〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, . . . , 〈xN , yN〉}, where xℓ is a d-
dimensional real vector, and yℓ has a boolean domain {0, 1}. The output is a prediction
function, which predicts y = 1 with probability
ρ(ω∗, x) =
exp (ωT∗ x)
1 + exp (ωT∗ x)
.










where the loss function is defined as
Lω(x, y) = −y log(ρ(ω, x))− (1− y) log(1− ρ(ω, x)),
and Λ is the regularization parameter.
In [8], it is showed that the sensitivity of the output perturbation approach on logistic
regression is 2
NΛ
, where Λ is the regularization parameter and N is the dataset size. Note
that this means this bound becomes∞ when no regularization is used.
SVM
Another widely used classification technique is support vector machine (SVM). It has
promising empirical performance in many practical applications, and especially works well
with high-dimensional data. Given a set of training examples, each marked for belonging to
one of two categories, an SVM training algorithm builds a model that assigns new examples
into one category or the other, making it a non-probabilistic binary linear classifier. An
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SVM model is a representation of the examples as points in space, mapped so that the
examples of the separate categories are divided by a clear gap that is as wide as possible.
The input is a dataset D = {〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, . . . , 〈xN , yN〉}, where xℓ is a d-




1 if αT∗ · x+ β∗ > 0
0 otherwise,










where the loss function Lα,β(x, y) is defined as
Lα,β(x, y) = max{1− 4(y − 0.5)(αTx+ β − 0.5), 0},
and Λ is the regularization parameter.
Rubinstein et al. [26] used the same approach for perturbing the parameters outputed
by the SVM classifier and showed that the sensivitiy of the SVM learning algorithm can




, where Λ is the regularization parameter, L is the Lipschitz constant
of loss function, κ is the bound of kernel, d is dataset dimensionality and N is the dataset
size.
2.6.2 Objective Perturbation
We have seen that the global sensitivities of these optimization problems are very high,
making direct output perturbation an ineffective method. An interesting approach, first
27
introduced in [8], is to perturb the optimization objective function so that solving it results
in a private solution. We now discuss two such techniques.
Adding a Noisy Linear Term to the Optimization Objective Function
One method, proposed by Chaudhuri et al. [8, 10], is to add a Laplacian noise to the
optimization objective function. We want to solve
arg min
ω









where c(ω) is the regularizer.
Assuming that both L(ω, xi) and c(ω) are strictly convex and everywhere differentiable
for ω. Then define the new objective function to be




where b is a random noise sampled from a distribution with density 1
α
e−β‖b‖, α is a normal-
izing constant and β is a function of ǫ.
The privacy of this method is proved as follows.
Proposition 2.6.1 Solving arg minω J
∗(D,ω) satisfies ǫ-DP.
Proof Suppose we have any two neighboring dataset D =
(x1, y1), . . . , (xN−1, yN−1), (a, y) and D′ = (x1, y1), . . . , (xN−1, yN−1). For any ω∗
output by our algorithm, we want to show that
Pr [ω∗|D]
Pr [ω∗|D′] ≤ e
ǫ.
Since the regularization function J and the loss function L are strictly convex and




is 0. Therefore, for the two neighboring datasetsD andD′, there are unique
values of noise b that maps the different inputs to the same output ω∗.
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‖b1 − b2‖ =
∥∥∥∥∂J(D,ω)∂ω − ∂J(D′, ω)∂ω
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∂L(ω, (a, y))∂ω − ∂L(ω, (a′, y′))∂ω
∥∥∥∥
≤ ∆.








≤ e ǫ∆ ·‖b1−b2‖ ≤ eǫ.
Chaudhuri et al. [8, 10] showed that ∆ ≤ 2 for both logistic regression and SVM. The
loss function of logistic regression is differentiable and can be bounded by 1, Therefore,
‖b1 − b2‖ =




∥∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥∥∂L(ω, (a′, y′))∂ω
∥∥∥∥
≤ 2.
Although the loss function of SVM, Lω(x, y) = max{1− y(αTx+β), 0}, is not differ-
entiable, Chaudhuri et al. [10] proposed to use a differentiable version of this loss function,
and showed that its first order derivative can be bounded by 1 and the noise scale can be
bounded by 2.
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It is difficult to analyze the impact of adding such linear terms to the objective function
on the accuracy of the optimization results; however, experimental results show that this
method is not very promising.
The Functional Mechanism
Zhang et al. [11] proposed to perturb the optimization objective function by first ap-
proximating the objective function using a polynomial, and then perturbing each and every
coefficient of the polynomial.
Given an objective function J(D,ω) =
∑
ti∈D L(ti, ω), the function mechanism first









and then perturb the aggregated coefficients of each polynomial basis with Laplace noise.
In the above,D is the dataset, ti is the i-th tuple in the dataset and ω is the model parameter.
And Φj(j ∈ N) denote the set of all products of parameter ω’s coordinates {ω1, . . . , ωd}
with degree j,




For example, Φ0 = {1}, Φ1 = {ω1, . . . , ωd}, and Φ2 = {ωi · ωj|i, j ∈ [1, d]}.
Algorithm 1 Functional Mechanism
INPUTD: Dataset, J(D,ω): objective function, ǫ: privacy parameter
Output ω∗: best parameter vector





for each 0 ≤ j ≤ U do
for each φ ∈ Φj do
set λφ =
∑












Compute ω∗ = arg minω J¯(D,ω) return ω∗
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The functional mechanism can be applied to linear regression. The expansion of objec-


































≤ 2(1 + 2d+ d2).
Note that this sensitivity becomes very large as d increases. Adding noises of this mag-
nitude to every coefficient, and then optimizing for that objective function results in poor
performances.
For other regression tasks, e.g. logistic regression, where the objective function are not
a polynomial with finite order, Zhang et al. [11] proposed to use the first two order terms
of Taylor expansion to approximate this kind of objective function.
Functional Mechanism adds more perturbation to the objective function than the previ-
ous method, and thus perform even worse.
2.6.3 Make an Existing Algorithm Private
Another approach is to take a non-private optimization algorithm, and to apply the
Laplace Mechanism or the Exponential Mechanism to ensure that every step is private.
Often times, one takes an iterative algorithm for an optimization task, and then makes each
iteration private. Here, one main parameter is the number of iterations. When the number is
too small, then the algorithm is far from converging. On the other hand, when the number
is too large, each iteration has very little privacy budget, and too much noise is added to
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each iteration. Intuitively, this method is sub-optimal because the amount of perturbation
added in this approach ensures that outputting all the intermediate results together is private,
whereas only the final output is needed.
DPLloyd: Differentially Private Lloyd Algorithm for k-means Clustering
The k-means clustering problem has been used as a motivating application for PINQ (
[7]), a platform for interactive privacy preserving data analysis. McSherry implemented
k-means clustering using the PINQ system ( [27]). We call this the DPLloyd approach.
DPLloyd fixes the total number of iterations to be 5 in [7]. It adds Laplacian noise to
the iterative update step in the Lloyd algorithm. Each iteration requires computing the
total number of points in a cluster and, for each dimension, the sum of the coordinates
of the data points in a cluster. Let d be the number of dimensions. Then, each tuple is
involved in answering dt sum queries and t count queries. To bound the sensitivity of the
sum query to a small number r, each dimension is normalized to [−r, r]. Thus, the global








Input: d: number of dimensions,C: cluster, ǫs: privacy budget for sum queries, ǫc: privacy
budget for count queries





















6: return Cluster centroids 〈o1, o2, . . . , od〉
The algorithm is given in Algorithm 3. The overall structure of DPLloyd is to first
select initial values, and then iteratively improve them. This same algorithmic structure
also applies to many other data analysis tasks, such as linear regression, SVM, etc. When
making such an interactive and iterative algorithm differentially private, there are several
important decisions one has to make.
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Algorithm 3 DPLLOYD
Input:D: dataset, d: number of dimensions, [−r, r]: dataset range, k: number of clusters,
t: number of iterations, IC: set of initial centroids, ǫ: privacy budget
1: if IC is empty then
2: Randomly select k points {o1, o2, . . . , ok} as initial centroids
3: else
4: {o1, o2, . . . , ok} ← IC
5: end if
6: ǫ′ ← ǫ
(dr+1)t
7: for Loop t times do
8: for each j (j = 1, 2, . . . , k) do
9: Cluster Cj ← {xℓ : ‖xℓ − oi‖ ≤ ‖xℓ − oj‖, xℓ ∈ D, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k}
10: 〈oj1, oj2, . . . , ojd〉 ← NOISYCENTROIDUPDATE(d, Cj, ǫ′, ǫ′)
11: end for
12: end for
13: return {o1, o2, . . . , ok}
The first decision is how to select the initial values. In the standard, non-private setting,
a purely random choice may suffice, since one could repeat the algorithm multiple times
and choose the best result among them. With privacy constraints, however, running the
interactive algorithm multiple times means that each run can use only a fraction of the total
privacy budget, causing the results to be less accurate. Thus the choice of initial values
becomes more important. In the case of k-means clustering, many methods for choosing
the initial points have been developed, see, e.g. [28]. However, these methods all need
access to the dataset, and it is unclear how to perform them in a differentially privately
way. Therefore, DPLloyd randomly generates k points as the initial centroids.
The second decision is how many iterations one runs. A large number of iterations
causes too much noises being added. A small number of iterations may be insufficient for
the algorithm to converge. Existing approaches fixes a number. However, intuitively the
number of rounds would depend both on the available privacy budget ǫ and the quality of
the initial values. With a smaller privacy budget, one should run fewer number of rounds,
to avoid the results being overwhelmed by too much noise.
The third decision is how to allocate the privacy budget across different rounds. Al-
most by default existing approaches allocate privacy budget equally across different rounds.
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However, intuitively this is not optimal. In later rounds, when one gets closer to the optimal
value, it is desirable to have a larger privacy budget.
In the implementation of DPLloyd in PINQ, it is proposed to run 5 iterations, with equal
privacy budget allocation for each round. It appears that this setting works quite well across
across many datasets. In [29], when a method newly proposed for k-means clustering was
compared with DPLloyd, the experiments were done by running DPLloyd with 20, 80, and
200 iterations, resulting in artificially poor performance of DPLloyd.
In [30], it is proposed that when the number of rounds is not fixed, one uses exponen-
tially decreasing allocation of privacy budgets, i.e., ǫ
2
in the first round, ǫ
4
in the second
round, and so on. This mostly likely results in deteriorating performance when the number
of rounds increases. Using this method, in later rounds, when one hopes to get closer to
the optimal value, increasingly larger noises are added due to the exponentially decreasing
privacy budget. If one does not allocate privacy budgets equally across all rounds, then one
should allocate smaller privacy budgets for the earlier rounds and larger privacy budgets
for the later rounds, although one cannot do that without knowing fixing the total number
of rounds.
DiffPID3: Differential Private ID3 Algorithm for Decision Tree Classification
In [16], the algorithm for constructing an ID3 decision tree classifier is made differen-
tially private. When the ID3 algorithm needs to get the number of tuples with a specific
feature value, it queries the SuLQ interface to get the corresponding noise count. The
DiffPID3 algorithm in [9] improved this approach by redesigning the classic ID3 classifier
construction algorithm to consider the feature quality function with lower sensitivity and
using the exponential mechanism to evaluate all the attributes simultaneously. Specifically,
the DiffPID3 algorithm starts with the most general partition of the underlying dataset.
Then, the algorithm chooses the attribute that maximizes the purity by using the expo-
nential mechanism and splits the dataset with the selected attribute. The same process is





INPUT: D: Dataset, A = {A1, . . . , Ad}: set of attributes, C: class attribute, ǫ: pri-
vacy parameter, d: maximal tree depth, ǫ′ = ǫ
2(d+1)










Dc ← Partition(D, ∀c ∈ C : rC = c)
∀c ∈ C : Nc = NoisyCountǫ′(Dc) return a leaf labeled with argmaxc(Nc)
end if
A¯← ExpMechǫ′(A, q)
Di ← Partition(D, ∀i ∈ A¯ : rA¯ = i)
for each i ∈ A¯ do
Subtreei ← DiffPID3(Di,A \ A¯, C, d− 1, ǫ′)
end forreturn a tree with a root node labeled A¯ and edges labeled 1 to |A¯| each going
to subtreei.
The Sample and Aggregation framework provides another approach to deal with private
data analysis, and grows out of the concept of local sensitivity [25]. However, to satisfy
differential privacy by adding noises based on the local sensitivity rather than the global
sensitivity, one needs to be able to analyze the local sensitivity and come up with a smooth
bound of it [25]. Oftentimes the function is too complex for analyzing the local sensitivity.
k-means clustering is such an example. While intuitively adding one data point is unlikely
to change the result by much for most datasets, it is difficult to analyze the effect of adding
one data point, in part because of the iterative nature of the algorithm.
The Sample and Aggregation framework is introduced to handle such cases. Given a
dataset D and a function f , SAF first partitions D into m blocks, then it evaluates f on
each of the block, and finally it privately aggregates results from all blocks into a single
one. The effectiveness of this approach depends on two assumptions. First, f(D) can be
approximated by evaluating f on the partitions (i.e., blocks) ofD. Second, the aggregation
step can be designed to be of low sensitivity, e.g., by taking average of all outputs. Since
any single tuple in D falls in one and only one block, adding one tuple can affect at most
one block’s result, limiting the sensitivity of the aggregation step. Thus one can add less
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Figure 2.2.: An illustration of the sample and aggregate framework.
Algorithm 5 Sample and Aggregate
INPUT Dataset D, length of dataset n, privacy parameter ǫ, output range (min, max)
Let l = n0.4
Randomly partitionD in to k disjoint blocks,D1, . . . , Dk
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
Oi ← Output of user application on dataset Di










The Sample and Aggregation framework was implemented in the GUPT system [29].
Authors of [29] implemented k-means clustering and used it to illustrate the effective-
ness of GUPT. We call this algorithm GkM. Given a dataset D, it first partitions D into
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m = N0.4 blocks D1, D2, . . . , Dm. Then, for each block Dj , it calculates its k centroids













where [min,max] is the estimated output range.
2.6.4 Iterative Local Search via EM
Instead of adding making individual steps in an optimization algorithm private, another
approach is to iteratively apply the exponential mechanism to gradually improve the current
choice of ω. In order to do this, one has to generate a candidate set, e.g., by generating
multiple perturbation of the current ω, and then selects among the set in a private fashion.
We now look at some examples of such algorithms.
PrivGene: Differentially Private Model Fitting Using Genetic Algorithms
PrivGene [12] is a general-purpose differentially private model fitting framework based
on genetic algorithms. Given a dataset D and a fitting function f(D,ω) that measures how
well the parameter ω fits the datasetD, the PrivGene algorithm initializes a candidate set of
possible parameters ω and iteratively refines them by mimicking the process of natural evo-
lution. Specifically, in each iteration, PrivGene selects m′ parameters from the candidate
set, and generates from them offsprings by crossover and mutation. Then, it creates a new
parameter set, which includes all and only the offsprings. At the end of the last iteration, a
single parameter is selected and outputted as the final result.
This algorithm is given in Algorithm 6. PrivGene is applied to logistic regression,
SVM, and k-means clustering. In the case of k-means clustering, the NICV formula in
Equation 2.8, more precisely its non-normalized version, is used as the fitting function f ,
and the set of k cluster centroids is defined as parameter ω. Initially, the candidate set is
populated with 200 sets of cluster centroids randomly sampled from the data space, each
set containing exactly k centroids. Then, the algorithm runs iteratively for Nǫ/(800m′)
rounds, wherem′ is empirically set to 10, and N is the dataset size.
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Algorithm 6 PrivGene
INPUTD: Dataset, J : objective function, ǫ: privacy parameter,m,m′ :sizes of candidate
set Ω and selected set Ω′, r: number of iterations
Output ω: best parameter vector identified by PrivGene
Initialize candidate set Ω withm randomly generated vectors
for i = 1 to r − 1 do
Ω′ ← DPSelect(D, J,Ω, m′, ǫ/r)
Ω← {}
for j = 1 tom/2 do
Randomly choose two vectors ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω′ as parent parameters
Compute (v1, v2)← Crossover(ω1, ω2)
Mutate(v1) andMutate(v2)
Add two offspring parameters v1, v2 to Ω
end for
end for
{ω} ← DPSelect(D, J,Ω, 1, ǫ/r) return ω
Algorithm 7 DPSelect
INPUT D: Dataset, J : objective function, Ω: parameter candidate set, m′: number of
parameter vectors to be selected from Ω, ǫs: privacy parameter
Output Ω′: set of selected parameter vectors
Ω′ ← {}
For each ω ∈ Ω, compute J(D,ω)
for i = 1 tom′ do
Use privacy budget ǫs/m
′ to apply the exponential mechanism to select the parameter
vector ω∗ from Ω that aims to minimize J(D,ω∗).
Remove ω∗ from Ω, and add ω∗ to Ω′
end forreturn Ω′
While the idea of making a genetic programming algorithm differentially private is
interesting, the effectiveness of Algorithm 6 is questionable for several reasons. First, the
crossover operation often does not result in competitive candidates. Second, with crossover
and mutation, the convergence rate is low, which means a larger number of iterations are
needed. Third, for each iteration, the algorithm requires making m′ selections, with every
single one of them consuming some privacy budget.
Iterative Local Search
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A more effective local search algorithm can be developed using some ideas from the
PrivGene paper, but does not use features of genetic programming. Such an algorithm is
implemented in the code accompanying the PrivGene paper [12], even though the algorithm
did not appear in the paper. We give the algorithm below.
Algorithm 8 ExpSearch
INPUT D: Dataset, J : objective function, ǫ: privacy parameter, r: number of iterations,
ω0: initial parameter, s: step of search, β < 1: scaling parameter
Output ω: selected parameter
ω ← ω0
for i = 1 to r − 1 do
Ω← {}
for j ∈ {1..d} do
ω1 ← ω with j’s attribute+ s
ω2 ← ω with j’s attribute− s
Ω← Ω ∪ {ω1, ω2}
compute J(D,ω1) and J(D,ω2)
end for
ω ← Use privacy budget ǫ/r to apply the exponential mechanism to select the pa-
rameter vector ω∗ from Ω that aims to maximize J(D,ω∗).
s← s ∗ β
end forreturn ω
This algorithm has several interesting ideas. Each round, it uses the exponential mech-
anism to select a single local perturbation that improves the current solution the best. Com-
pared with PrivGene, which selects multiple candidates (for the purpose of using crossovers
to generate the pool of candidates), this means that more privacy budget can be used in each
selection. Since only one candidate is selected, there is no crossover. The mutation step
takes the form of perturbing the coefficient in one dimension. That is, each iteration can
be viewed as moving along one dimension towards a potentially better parameter. Finally,
the perturbation step s exponentially decays so that the amount of changes decreases. This
makes sense as when one starts to converge to the optimal parameter, smaller adjustments
are needed. Also, this feature of exponential decay of the perturbation step can also take
advantage of the enhanced exponential mechanism, to be discussed below. This method
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is most useful when the goal is to find a vector of coefficients, as in the case of logistic
regression and SVM.
Enhanced Exponential Mechanism
An Enhanced version of the Exponential Mechanism (EEM) is proposed in [12], which
can be used in the iterative local search algorithm. Recall that the quality function we use
is the optimization objective function J(D,ω). In the standard Exponential Mechanism,
one considers the maximal difference between the values of the quality function on two
neighboring datasets D and D′, i.e.,∆J = max∀ω,D≃D′ |J(D,ω)− J(D′, ω)|.
EEM is suitable for the case where the dependency of the quality function on the dataset
D can be computed by summing up some score for each record t ∈ D, i.e.,




In this case, when making a selection among a setΩ, one could also use as global sensitivity
the maximal difference between Lω(x) and Lω′(x) where ω, ω
′ ∈ Ω, and x is any data ele-
ment in the input dataset. This is particularly effectively in the local search paradigm where
the set of candidates are all minor perturbations, and thusmaxx,ω,ω′(|Lω(x)−Lω′(x)|)may
be small.










∆1 is exactly the global sensitivity used in the standard exponential mechanism (here
the bounded interpretation of DP is used), while ∆2 is a new global sensitivity designed
specifically for additive quality functions.
When EEM is used in PrivGene and iterative local search, ∆2 is usually smaller than
∆1. This is because that as more iterations are performed, the quality of the parameter vec-
tors in the candidate set becomes increasingly close to each other as the algorithm converges
to (possibly local) optimal. Thus, it is likely that the maximum value of Lω(x) − Lω′(x)
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gradually decreases with the number of iterations performed, leading to decreasing∆2. ∆1,
on the other hand, is not significantly affected by this phenomenon. Therefore, EEM can
make more accurate selection in each iteration as the algorithm converges.
2.6.5 Histograms Optimized for Optimization
The final approach we consider is to publish a synopsis of the dataset, often in the form
of a noisy histogram, so that synthetic datasets can be generated and optimizers can be
learned from these synthetic datasets. Publishing a synopsis enables additional exploratory
and predictive data analysis tasks to be performed, and can be argued to be more preferred.
Uniform Griding and Its Extensions
For low-dimensional datasets with numerical attributes, UG and its extension can be
applied. UG (Uniform Griding) is a simple algorithm proposed in [31] for producing syn-
opsis of 2-dimensional datasets that can be used to answer rectangular range queries (i.e.,
how many data points there are in a rectangular range) with high accuracy. The algorithm
partitions the space into M = m × m equal-width grid cells, and then releases the noisy
count in each cell. It is observed that for counting queries, a largerM value results in higher
errors because more noises are added, and a smallerM value results in higher errors due to
the fact that points within cells may be distributed nonuniformly, and queries including a
portion of these cells may be answered inaccurately. To balance these two kinds of errors,









It has been shown thatUG performs quite well for answering rectangular range queries [31].









where θ = 10. And the new algorithm is called extended uniform griding, EUG. When the
dimensionality d increases, this approach does not scale very well.
Histogram Publishing for estimating M-Estimators
Lei [33] proposed a scheme to release differentially private histogram tailored for the
M-estimator. Similar to UG and EUG, it partitions the data space into equal-width grid
cells. However, it uses a different method to determine how many grid cells to use. Given








Theoretical bounds on accuracy for M-estimator is a generalization of maximum like-
lihood estimation. Given a dataset D = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} and a target function ρ, it deter-
mines a parameter ω∗, such that





Note that the only difference the above approach has from UG is in how the number of
cells is determined. We note that unlike UG, the above approach for choosingM does not
depend on ǫ.
DiffGen: Differentially Private Anonymization Based on Generalization
Mohammed et al. [34] proposed DiffGen to publish histogram for classification under
differential privacy. It consists of two steps, partition and perturbation. Given a dataset
D and taxonomy trees for each predictor attribute, the partition step starts by generalizing
all attribute’s values into the topmost nodes in their taxonomy trees and then iteratively
selects one attribute’s taxonomy tree node at a time for specialization by using the standard
exponential mechanism. The quality of each candidate specialization is based on the same
heuristics used by the decision tree constructions, such as information gain and majority
class. The partition step terminates after a given number of specializations. The perturba-
tion step injects Laplace noise into each cell of the partition and outputs all the cells with
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their noisy counts as the noisy synopsis of the data. Privacy budget needs to be evenly
distributed to all the levels in the tree. Thus, only a small portion of budget can be assigned
to each node splitting. This would result the histogram structured to be far from optimal
and result performance of the algorithm.
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3. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE DATA PUBLICATION FOR
CLASSIFICATION
3.1 Introduction
Classification is an important tool for data analysis. However, publishing parameters
of a classifier learned from a dataset can result in privacy concerns [35], [36]. One way
to deal with the privacy concerns is to conduct classification while satisfying differential
privacy [5]. Several approaches for learning classifiers while satisfying differential privacy
have been proposed in recent years. Some methods compute a classifier as the output [16],
[8], [9], [10], [37], [38]. Other methods [34], [39], [12] publish a synopsis of the dataset,
often in the form of a noisy histogram, so that synthetic datasets can be generated and
classifiers can be learned from these synthetic datasets. Publishing a synopsis enables
additional exploratory and predictive data analysis tasks to be performed, and can be argued
to be more preferred.
Publishing noisy histograms for one-dimensional or two-dimensional datasets has been
studied extensively in recent years, see [40] for a recent survey. However, as observed
in [39], [41] these approaches do not work well when the number of attributes/dimensions
goes above a few. Many datasets that are of interest have multiple attributes. For a multi-
attribute dataset with more than a dozen or so attributes, publishing a histogram with all
the attributes results in a sparse histogram where noises may overwhelm the true counts.
Therefore it is necessary to select a subset of the attributes that are “useful” for the intended
data analysis tasks, and to determine how to discretize the attributes. These selections
partition the domain into a number of cells. We call the result a “grid”. Once a grid is
selected, the next step is straightforward: one adds Laplace noises [5] to the cell counts to
produce a noisy histogram.
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Thus the key design choice in algorithms for publishing noisy histograms is how to
select a suitable grid. Publishing a histogram is similar to performing generalization for the
purpose of achieving k-anonymization, since the exact attribute values for records within
a cell no longer matter, and only the cell boundary and the number of records in a cell
matter. A key challenge studied in research on k-anonymization was also how to find a
high-quality grid [42], [43], [44]. However, these proposed methods for k-anonymization
have been found to be vulnerable to attacks exploiting background information, e.g., the
minimality attack [45], [46]. Fortunately, an approach to select a grid while satisfying
differential privacy, as proposed in this chapter, can defend against these attacks.
In this chapter we propose the PrivPfC (Private Publication for Classification) approach
for publishing projected histograms. On the key decision of how to select a grid, PrivPfC
differs from previous approaches in that it selects a high-quality grid in a single step,
whereas previous approaches use an iterative process and as a consequence suffer from
two weaknesses. First, an iterative process has to divide the privacy budget among all the
iterations, causing the choice made in each iteration to have significant noise. Second, an
iterative process is a greedy process and tends to result in a sub-optimal global choice even
without considering noises.
The exponential mechanism [14] enables the private selection of a grid in a single step.
However, there are a number of challenges to use it effectively. One needs to generate
a set of candidate grids that include the high-quality grids, without making the candidate
set too large, which affects both running time and accuracy. Furthermore, one needs a
quality function that can effectively identify high-quality grids and simultaneously has a
low sensitivity.
The first contribution of this chapter is PrivPfC, an algorithm for privately publish-
ing noisy histograms optimized for classification. PrivPfC has two novel ideas. One is a
method to enumerate through candidate grids when given a cap on how many grids the
algorithm is allowed to consider; and the other is a new quality function that enables the
selection of a high-quality “grid”. This quality function considers the impact of injected
noises on the classification accuracy, adapts to the privacy parameter ǫ, and has a low sen-
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sitivity. As demonstrated in [14], any mechanism that satisfies differential privacy can be
simulated using the exponential mechanism; thus conceptually any private data analysis
problem can be solved by finding a way to enumerate the likely solutions and an effec-
tive quality function. PrivPfC solves the problem of finding a suitable grid for publishing
histograms optimized for classification.
Our second contribution is that, through extensive experiments on real datasets, we
have compared PrivPfC against other state-of-the-art methods for data publishing as well
as private classification, demonstrating that PrivPfC improves the state-of-the-art. We also
analyze variants of competing algorithms, showing that their weaknesses come from the
iterative structure of their algorithms. We note that the fact that PrivPfC outperforms
state-of-the-art algorithms specifically designed for privately publishing classifiers is quite
counter-intuitive. PrivPfC publishes a histogram, which contains more information than a
classifier; thus one would expect the classifiers it produces are less accurate. Experimental
results demonstrate otherwise. We believe this points to the posibility of designing better
private classification algorithms by using as few steps as possible, avoiding spreading the
privacy budget too thin.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Our PrivPfC approach is presented in
Section 3.2. The experimental results are shown in Section 3.3.
3.2 PrivPfC Framework












Figure 3.1.: Taxonomy hierarchies of Relationship attribute and Education-num attribute.
We consider a dataset with a set of predictor variables and one response variable. The
predictor variables can be numerical or categorical. Following [42], [47], [48], [34], for
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each predictor variable Ai, we assume the existence of a taxonomy hierarchy (also called
a generalization hierarchy in the literature). Figure 3.1 shows the taxonomy hierarchies
for Relationship, a categorical variable, and Education-num, a numerical variable. In a
hierarchy, the root node represents the whole domain of the variable, and a parent node is
a generalization (or a cover) of its children. Child nodes under the same parent node are
semantically closer to each other than to nodes under a different parent node.
Each level of a predictor variable’s taxonomy hierarchy forms a partition of its domain.
On the basis of the taxonomy hierarchy and its levels, we introduce the notion of a grid.
Definition 3.2.1 (Grid) Let A = {A1, . . . , Ad} be the set of predictor variables in a
dataset and {T1, . . . , Td} be their taxonomy hierarchies respectively. Let hi be the height
of Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Then, a grid g is given by 〈ℓ1, . . . , ℓd〉, where 1 ≤ ℓi ≤ hi and 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Such a grid g defines a partitioning of the data domain into cells where each attribute Ai
is partitioned into the values at level ℓi. The number of cells of a grid is Π
d
i=1|Ti[li]|, where
|Ti[li]| is the number of nodes in the level li of the hierarchy Ti. And the number of all
possible grids is Πdi=1hi.
Definition 3.2.2 (Histogram) Given a datasetD and a grid g, a histogram H(D, g) parti-
tions D into cells according to g, and in each cell outputs the number of records for each
value of the response variable.
PrivPfC publishes H˜(D, g), a noisy histogram of the input dataset D, which adds
Laplace noise into the counts in the histogram H(D, g). The key challenge lies in selecting
a suitable grid g. Our approach is to define a quality score for each grid, which measures
the usefulness for classification of each grid, and apply the exponential mechanism [14] to
privately select a grid.
3.2.1 The Quality Function
The quality function needs to satisfy two conditions. First, it needs to accurately mea-
sure the desirability of using a particular grid g. Second, it should have a low sensitivity.
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Intuitively, we want to ensure that classifiers learned from H˜(D, g), a noisy histogram of
D using g to partition the data domain, are close to classifiers learned from D directly.
Furthermore, we desire this to hold regardless of which particular classification algorithm
is used.
We propose to define the quality function to maximize the number of records in D
that are classified correctly by the following classifier: for each cell in the grid defined
by g, it predicts the class with highest count according to the noisy histogram H˜(D, g).
This classifier is in the same spirit as histogram classifiers [49], and we use HC H˜(D,g) to
denote it. When a grid g is fixed, the noisy histogram includes random noises; therefore,
the number of correctly classified records is a random variable. We use the expected value
of this random variable as the quality function. Therefore, the quality of the grid g can be
defined as:
Definition 3.2.3 (Grid Quality) Given a dataset D with k different class labels, L =
{1, 2, . . . , k}, a grid g and ǫ for the parameter of adding Laplace noise to the counts,
the grid quality is measured by the expected number of correctly classified records of the






nic · pic, (3.1)
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where i ∈ L ranges over the class labels, nic is the number of data points in the cell c with
class label i and pic is the probability that class i is the dominant class in cell c (i.e., with
the highest noise count) after injecting Laplace noises. The probability pic is given below:
pic = Pr [Class i is the dominant class after adding noise]
= Pr
[























where Zi is the Laplace noise added to class i’s count, and f(·) and F (·) are, respectively,
the probabilistic density function and the cumulative distribution function of the Laplace
distributionLap(1/ǫ). The probability pic depends on ǫ, the privacy budget for perturbation,
as well as on the counts of the various classes in the cell c.
Intuitively, since the grid quality function gq (Eq. 3.1) counts number of records, it
should have a low sensitivity, since adding or removing a record affects only one of the
counts, and changes the count by just 1. However, changing the counts also affects the
probabilities. Thus, analyzing the sensitivity of the quality function is quite non-trivial.
3.2.2 Sensitivity in the Binary Classification Case
We first study the sensitivity of the grid quality (Eq. 3.1) in the special case where the
response variable is binary.
Lemma 1 (Grid Quality for Binary Classification) Given a dataset D with class labels
L = {1, 2}, the global sensitivity of the quality function gq is bounded by 1.1.



































2− (4− 2eǫ) eǫ + ǫ2eǫ
−ǫ+ ǫeǫ .












Figure 3.2.: Illustration of the sensitivity of grid quality (Eq. 3.3).
Lemma 2 gives the distribution of the difference of two i.i.d. Laplace random variables,
which will be used in the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 ( [50]) Let Z1 and Z2 be two i.i.d. random variables that follow the Laplace
distribution with mean 0 and scale 1
ǫ




e−ǫ|y|(1 + ǫ|y|) −∞ < y <∞,
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The following is the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof We show the global sensitivity of the grid quality (Eq. 3.1) in the binary classifica-
tion setting can be safely upperbounded.
Given a dataset D, and without loss of generality we assume that the neighboring
dataset of D is D′ = D − t , where the tuple t has class label 1. The quality value of
all cells other than cell e are the same, and n1e = n
′1





The sensitivity of the grid quality function for binary classification can be computed by,
∆gq = |gq(D, g)− gq(D′, g)|









= |p1e + (n1e − 1)(p1e − p
′1







= |p1e + (n1e − n2e − 1)(p1e − p
′1
e )|, (3.6)
where p1e is the probability of Class 1 is still the dominant class after adding noise. The last
equality holds, because p2e = 1− p1e and p′2e = 1− p′1e .
As for p1e, by Lemma 2,
p1e = Pr
[










































e − 1− n2e ≥ 0.
































By letting x = n1e − n2e, we have
∆gq =
















































Thus, by Lagrange’s Mean Value Theorem, there exists some ξ between x− 1 and x (thus
ξ > 0), so that
∆gq = |1 + g1(x− 1)− g1(x)|
= |1− g′1(ξ)|
=
∣∣∣∣1− e−ǫξ4 (2− ǫ2ξ2)
∣∣∣∣ .
To bound the expression above, consider another function











































, h(x) decreases and lies in (1, 1.1], because lim
x→+∞
h(x) = 1. Therefore, in
this case,













e − 1− n2e < 0.
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Then, the sensitivity becomes
∆gq = |g2(x)− g2(x− 1)| .


















the function g′2(x) reaches the minimum value




, g′2(x) ∈ [−0.09, 0) because lim
x→−∞
g′2(x) = 0 and




, 0]. Applying Lagrange’s Mean Value Theorem
to g2(x), there exists some η between x and x− 1, thus η ≤ 0, so that
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∆gq = |g2(x)− g2(x− 1)|
= |g′2(η)|
≤ 0.5.
In summary, by considering the above two cases, the global sensitivity for grid quality





2− (4− 2eǫ) eǫ + ǫ2eǫ
−ǫ+ ǫeǫ .
The global maximum point x∗ is obtained by taking derivative of 1 + g1(x − 1) − g1(x).
This completes the proof.
Lemma 1 enables us to compute the sensitivity of the quality function for each ǫ value
used for adding noises. Figure 3.2 shows the calculated sensitivity for 700 different ǫ values
in the range of 0.00001 to 100. We note that each time one invokes PrivPfC, the ǫ value
is fixed and one can thus compute the sensitivity to be used in the exponential mechanism.
Using this instead of 1.1 slightly improves the utility, while ensuring the satisfaction of
differential privacy.
3.2.3 Sensitivity of Grid Quality in the Multiclass Classification Case
For the general multiclass classification case, where there are more than two class la-
bels, deriving an analytical formula similar to Lemma 1 is challenging. Recall that the
noisy histogram classifier determines the class label of each cell by ranking all classes ac-
cording to their noisy counts. The grid quality (Eq. 3.1) models the process by computing
the probability that each class is ranked first after adding noises count ranks first for each
cell. However, since k independent Laplace random variables are involved in this ranking
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process, getting the closed form of the density of the joint distribution is very challenging.
To get a function for the multiclass case whose global sensitivity is easy to bound, we pro-
pose a simple and effective approximation of the grid quality (Eq. 3.1) which for each cell
considers only the two classes with the highest number of counts in that cell.
Definition 3.2.4 (Approximation of Grid Quality) Given a dataset D with class labels
L = {1, 2, . . . , k}, where k > 2, a grid g and ǫ for the parameter of adding Laplacian









c are the highest class count and the second highest count in the cell c,
p
(1)
c is the probability that n
(1)
c + Z(1) >= n
(2)
c + Z(2) and p
(2)
c = 1− p(1)c .



















Figure 3.3.: Correlation between grid quality (Eq 3.1) and its approximation (Eq 3.8).
Average Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.936 with standard deviation 0.026.
We experimentally study the correlation between the grid quality function (Eq. 3.1)
and its approximation (Eq. 3.8) over 4 multiclass real datasets and 5 privacy budgets. In
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Figure 3.3, we can see that the simplified multiclass quality function is highly correlated
with the original one.
Lemma 3 For any ǫ > 0, the global sensitivity of the grid quality function for multiclass
classification (Eq. 3.8) is bounded by 1.1, that is,∆gq ≤ 1.1.
The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 1 by replacing two class counts n1c and





Algorithm 9 PrivPfC: Differentially Privately Publishing Data for Classification
Input: dataset D, the set of predictor variables A and their taxonomy hierarchies, total
privacy budget ǫ, maximum grid pool size Ω.
1: function PrivPfC(D,A, ǫ, Ω)
2: ǫN ← 0.03ǫ, ǫsh ← 0.37ǫ, ǫph ← 0.6ǫ
3: Nˆ ← |D|+ Lap(1/ǫN )
4: T ← 20% · Nˆ · ǫph
5: H← Enumerate(A,Ω, T )
6: h← selectHist(D,H, ǫsh)




Algorithm 10 PrivPfC: Differentially Privately Publishing Data for Classification
10: function Enumerate(A,Ω, T )
11: L0 ← {〈1, 1, . . . , 1〉}
12: count← 0
13: for k = 0→ |A| − 1 do
14: Lk+1 ← {}
15: for Each grid g ∈ Lk do
16: for j = 1→ |A| do
17: if gj = 1 then
18: for i = 2→ hj do
19: new g = g
20: new gj = i
21: if size(ng) ≤ T then
22: Lk+1 = Lk+1 ∪ ng
23: count← count+ 1















3.2.4 Candidate Grids Enumeration
PrivPfC takes as input Ω, the maximum number of candidate grids, and generates a
pool of at most Ω candidate grids. We also limit the number of cells in each candidate
grid, to prevent the average counts from being dominated by the injected noises. More
specifically, we limit the maximum allowed number of cells in any candidate grid g to be
T = 0.2 ∗ Nˆ ∗ ǫ, where ǫ is the privacy budget reserved for adding noises to the histogram,
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Algorithm 11 PrivPfC: Differentially Privately Publishing Data for Classification
36: function selectHist(D,H, ǫsh)
37: for i = 1→ |H| do
38: qi ← qual(Hi)
39: pi ← e−(qiǫsh)/2
40: end for
41: h← sample i ∈ [1..|H|] according to pi
42: return h
43: end function
44: function perturbHist(D, h, ǫph)
45: Initialize I to empty
46: for each cell c ∈ h do
47: nˆ+c ← n+c + Lap(1/ǫph)
48: nˆ−c ← n−c + Lap(1/ǫph)
49: Add (nˆ+c , nˆ
−
c ) to I
50: end for
51: Round all counts of I to their nearest non-negative integers.
52: return I
53: end function
and Nˆ is a noisy estimate of the total number of tuples. This ensures that the average noise
magnitude is no more than the 20% of the average cell count. This non-dominating rule
has been used in several differentially private data publishing papers [51], [38].
PrivPfC generates candidate grids by a level-wise search. It starts from the most general
grid, 〈1, 1, . . . , 1〉, where the whole domain is a single cell, and first generates L1, the list
of all grids that have a single attribute going beyond the top level, then generates L2, the
list of all grids that have exactly two attributes going beyond the top level, and so on. It
will include a grid as a candidate only when the grid includes no more than T cells. It stops
when either it has included all grids with no more than T cells, or it has included Ω grids.
The choice ofΩ depends on the amount of computing resources one is willing to spend.
When Ω is too large, one runs out of candidate grids that have at most T cells, and increas-
ing Ω further won’t increase the size of the pool.
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3.2.5 Putting Things Together for PrivPfC
Algorithm 9 shows PrivPfC (Line 1). PrivPfC has three main steps: (1) Enumerate
candidate grid (Line 5); (2) Privately select grid (Line 6); (3) Publish noisy counts (Line 7).
We divide the privacy budget into three portions: 3%ǫ is used to privately estimate the
dataset size, 37%ǫ is used for selecting grid (Function selectHist) and 60%ǫ is used for
publishing noisy counts (Function perturbHist). The enumeration step does not access the
dataset D and does not consume any privacy budget.
Theorem 3.2.1 PrivPfC in Algorithm 9 satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
The proof of Theorem 3.2.1 is straightforward based on the analysis above and the
sequential composability and parallel composability of differential privacy as discussed in
Section 2.5.
Time complexity. The most time consuming step of the algorithm is that of computing
the quality of all candidate grids (Line 6), which considers at most Ω candidate grids.
Computing the quality of one candidate grid takes time O(N) and therefore selecting the
grid takes a total time O(N ·Ω). Once a grid is selected, only a single pass over the dataset




Datasets. We use 8 real datasets for our experiments, 4 for binary classification and
4 for multiclass classification. They are summarized in Table 5.1. The first one is the
Adult dataset from the UCI machine learning repository [52]. It contains 6 numerical
attributes and 8 categorical attributes, and is widely used for evaluating the performance
of classification algorithms. After removing missing values, the dataset contains 45,222
tuples. We create a multiclass version of the Adult dataset, called Adult-Multiclass, by
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(c) US (d) BR
Figure 3.4.: Comparison of PrivPfC, DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH and DiffPC-4.5 by decision
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(c) US (d) BR
Figure 3.5.: Comparison of PrivPfC, DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH, PrivGene and PrivateERM
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(c) US (d) BR
Figure 3.6.: Comparison of PrivPfC, DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH and FunctionalMechanism
by logistic regression classification. x-axis: privacy budget ǫ in log-scale. y-axis: misclas-
sification rate in log-scale.
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The second dataset is the Bank marketing dataset from the same repository. It contains
10 numerical attributes and 10 categorical attributes on 41,188 individuals. The multiclass
version of the bank dataset is created by using 3-valued the poutcome attribute as the class
attribute. The third is the US dataset from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) [53]. It has 39,187 United States census records in 2010, with 15 numerical
attributes and 31 categorical ones. The multiclass version of the US dataset is created by
using the 4-valued SCHLTYPE attribute as the class attribute. We remove one categorical
attribute which is highly correlated with the SCHLTYPE attribute in the multiclass version
of US dataset. The fourth is the BR dataset (also from IPUMS), which contains 57,333
Brazil census records in 2010 and has 14 numerical attributes and 28 categorical ones. The
multiclass version of the BR dataset is created by using the 4-valued EMPSTAT attribute
as the class attribute.
Taxonomy Hierarchies. For the Adult and Adult-Multiclass datasets, we use the same
taxonomy hierarchies as those in DiffGen [34]. For the remaining 3 datasets, we create
taxonomy hierarchies as follows. For numerical attributes, we partition each domain into
equal size bins and build hierarchies over them. For categorical attributes, we build taxon-
omy hierarchies by considering the semantic meanings of the attribute values.
Competing Methods. We compare PrivPfC with 7 state-of-the-art methods in terms
of misclassification rate. These include 3 data-publishing methods that publish either a
noisy histogram or a noisy Bayesian network, which can be used to generate a synthetic
dataset: DiffGen [34], PrivBayes [38], and Private Projected Histogram (PPH) [39]; and
4 methods that directly output a classifier, PrivLocal, PrivGene [12], DiffPC-4.5 [9], and
PrivateERM [10]. Table 5.2 summarizes the competing methods mentioned in this chapter.
DiffGen [34]. DiffGen also uses taxonomy and publishes a noisy histogram. However,
it chooses the grid in a way different from PrivPfC. In DiffGen, one iteratively selects
one attribute at a time for specialization, using the exponential mechanism. The quality
function suggested in [34] aims to maximize the number of tuples that have the majority
class label in all cells. The number of specialization steps is an important parameter and
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is an input to the algorithm. As suggested in [34], we set the number of specialization
steps to be 10 for the Adult dataset, Adult-Multiclass and the bank dataset. For the US and
BR datasets, we set the number to be 6 and 8 respectively, as beyond these numbers, the
DiffGen implementation runs into memory problems, because the taxonomy trees for these
datasets have larger fan-outs.
PPH [39]. PPH also publishes a noisy histogram. It uses the exponential mechanism to
select k attributes, using a quality function that maximizes the discernibility score regarding
the label attribute. The grid is determined by the k attributes. For each categorical attribute,
the full domain is used. For a numerical attribute, it uses the formula proposed in Lei [33]
to decide how many bins to discretize the attribute domain.
PrivBayes [38]. PrivBayes publishes a noisy Bayesian network. It determines the structure
of a Bayesian network by first randomly selecting an attribute as the first node, and then
iteratively selecting another attribute to create a new node and up to k already created nodes
as the new node’s parent nodes. After the structure is determined, PrivBayes perturbs the
marginals needed for computing the conditional distributions. The performance of the
PrivBayes algorithm depends on k. We set k = 3 for the Adult dataset and the Bank
dataset, which is the same as the one used in [38]. For the US and BR datasets, which
were not used in [38], setting k = 3 runs out of memory in our experiments because these
datasets have more attributes; we set k = 2 for them.
Classifier-outputting Methods. PrivGene [12] is a general-purpose private model fitting
framework based on genetic algorithms, which can be applied to SVM classification and
logistic regression. PrivLocal is a differentially private local search algorithm. DiffPC-
4.5 [9] outputs a C-4.5 decision tree classifier differential-privately. PrivateERM [10] out-
puts an SVM classifier by injecting noise into the risk function first and then optimizing
the perturbed risk function.
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The source codes of DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH, DiffPC-4.5, PrivLocal were shared by
authors of corresponding papers. The source code of PrivateERMwas shared by the authors
of PrivGene. We implement the PrivGene algorithm by strictly following the paper [12].
Evaluation Methodology. The evaluation is based on 3 classification models: the CART
decision tree, the SVMwith radial basis kernel and the logistic regressionmodel. For all the
experiments, we vary ǫ from 0.05 to 1.0. Similar to the experiment settings of [9], [34], [39],
under each privacy budget, we execute 10-fold stratified cross-validation to evaluate the
misclassification rate of the above methods. For each train-test pair, we run the target
method 10 times. Each time we privately compute a classifier using the training data and
evaluates its accuracy on the testing data, which is disjoint from the training data. We
report the average measurements over the 10 runs and the 10-fold cross-validations. The
implementation and experiments of PrivPfC were done in Python 2.7 and all experiments
were conducted on an Intel Core i7-3770 3.40GHz PC with 16GB memory.
For methods that output a classifier, i.e., DiffPC-4.5, PrivateERM, PrivGene, PrivLocal
and FunctionalMechanism, we use parameters suggested by the corresponding papers. For
other data publishing methods, i.e., PrivPfC, PPH, DiffGen, and PrivBayes, we generate
private synthetic datasets and then use standard implementations of classification methods
on these datasets. To evaluate their performance in terms of the decision tree model, we
use the rpart [54] library to build decision trees on synthetic datasets. For evaluation in
terms of SVMmodel, we use the LibSVM package [55]. For evaluation in terms of logistic
regression, we use R’s glm (generalized linear model) function. When comparing different
approaches, We use the same sets of parameters for these classifiers.
We consider two baselines – Majority and NoiseFree. Majority is the misclassification
rate by majority voting on the class attribute, which predicts each test case with the majority
class label in the train dataset. NoiseFree is the misclassification rate of a decision tree, an
SVM classifier or a logistic regression classifier built on the true data. We expect that a




Table 3.1.: Dataset characteristics
Dataset # Dim # Num # Cate # Records # Classes Classification Task
Adult 15 6 8 45,222 2 Determine whether a person makes over 50K a year.
Adult-Multiclass 15 6 8 45,222 3 Determine the three classes marital status of a person.
Bank 21 10 10 2 41,188 Determine whether the client subscribed a term deposit.
Bank-Multiclass 21 10 10 3 41,188 Determine 3 types of outcome of previous marketing campaign.
US 47 15 31 39,187 2 Determine whether a person makes over 50K a year.
US-Multiclass 46 15 30 39,187 4 Determine the four types of school attended by a person.
BR 43 14 28 57,333 2 Determine whether a person makes over 300 per month.
BR-Multiclass 43 14 28 57,333 4 Determine the four types of employment status of a person.
6
7
Table 3.2.: Summary of differentially private classification methods
Methods Description
Data-publishing
PrivPfC Our proposed method.
PrivPfC-SelNF Our proposed method with noise-free grid selection.
DiffGen [34] Private data release for classification via recursive partitioning.
DiffGen-Struct-NF DiffGen with noise-free partitioning procedure.
PrivBayes [38] Private Data Release via Bayes network.
PrivBayes-Struct-NF PrivBayes with noise-free network learning procedure.
PPH [39] Private data release for classification by projection and perturbation.
Classifier-outputting
DiffPC-4.5 [9] Privately construct C4.5 decision tree classifier.
PrivGene [12] Private model fitting based on genetic algorithms.
PrivLocal [12] Private local search algorithm.
FunctionalMechanism [11] Private model fitting by perturbing the fitting function.
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(c) US-Multiclass (d) BR-Multiclass
Figure 3.7.: Comparison of PrivPfC, DiffGen, PPH, PrivLocal and PrivGene by decision
tree classification and logistic regression classification on the multiclass datasets. y-axis:
misclassification rate in log-scale.
3.3.2 Comparison with Existing Solutions
For each classification method, we compare PrivPfC with Ω = 10, 000, with three
existing data-publishing methods DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH and any classifier-outputting
method that can be applied to this classification method. We note that PrivBayes is not
designed to be optimized for a single classification task; thus in some sense is not expected
to perform well.
Figure 3.4 reports the average misclassification rates and the corresponding standard
deviations for decision tree. Clearly, PrivPfC has the best performance in most cases, fol-
lowed by DiffGen, PPH, DiffPC-4.5 and PrivBayes. The performance of PrivPfC is also the
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most robust, as can be seen from the fact that the standard deviations of its misclassification
rates are always the lowest.
Figure 3.5 shows similar experimental results for SVM classification. PrivPfC has the
best performance, followed by DiffGen, PrivLocal, PPH, PrivateERM, PrivBayes and Priv-
Gene. PrivGene performs the worst, because the crossover operation in each iteration sig-
nificantly destroys the structure selected SVM parameter by misaligning the parameter val-
ues to their corresponding dimensions. On the other hand, PrivLocal only uses perturbation
to generate offsprings and the structure of SVM parameters can be largely kept. This result
also confirms our remarks on the effectiveness of PrivGene.
Figure 3.6 reports the experimental results on Logistic regression. Overall PrivPfC has
the best performance, followed by PrivLocal, DiffGen, PPH, PrivBayes, FunctionalMech-
anism and PrivGene. PrivGene performs the worst again. Note that, in the US and BR
dataset, when the privacy budget is large, PrivLocal outperforms PrivPfC with a slight ad-
vantage. This is because PrivLocal has a tighter sensitivity bound when applying to logistic
regression. Besides, when the privacy budget is large, PrivPfC selects a subset of features
to build histogram, whereas the PrivLocal can use the full set of dimensions to build the
classifier.
Comparison on multiclass classification. We compare 5 approaches: PrivPfC, Diff-
Gen, PPH, PrivLocal and PrivGene on multiclass classification on 4 real datasets, Adult-
Multiclass, Bank-Multiclass, US-Multiclass and BR-Multiclass. The evaluations of the
three non-interactive data publishing methods, PrivPfC, DiffGen and PPH are done by the
decision tree classification, since these methods privately generate synthetic datasets and
decision tree can naturally supports multiclass classification. The PrivLocal and PrivGene
methods only produce one classifier, SVM or Logistic regression at a time. We therefore
use the One-vs.-rest approach [56] to reduce the multiclass classification problem into the
binary classification problem and use ǫ/k budget to train each classifier, where k is the
number of classes. Figure 3.7 shows the experimental results. PrivPfC is again the winner
in most cases.
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Figure 3.8.: Varying the maximum pool size Ω on PrivPfC by decision tree classification
on the BR dataset. y-axis: misclassification rate.
We now explore the effect of changing Ω, the maximum grid pool size, and the effect
of using different privacy budget allocation plans in PrivPfC. Figure 3.8 reports the results
of PrivPfC’s performance under three Ω values, 100, 10,000 and 200,000. The evaluation
is done on the BR dataset with two privacy budgets, 0.05 and 0.5. We can see that with the
increasing of the maximum pool size, PrivPfC’s performance gets significant improvement
from Ω = 100 to Ω = 10, 000. When setting Ω to the larger value, 200,000, PrivPfC also
gets a small amount of improvement.
PrivPfC distributes the privacy budget among three steps, size estimation, grid selection
and perturbation, in a 3%-37%-60%. While these ratios are somewhat arbitrary, we have
experimentally evaluated other ratios, allocating between 20% and 60% to each of the step
other than size estimation. We have found that the differences among different budget



















Figure 3.9.: Comparison of two different privacy budget allocations on PrivPfC by decision
tree classification on the Adult dataset. y-axis: misclassification rate in log-scale.
Figure 3.9 compares the result of PrivPfC with 3%-10%-87%, with PrivPfC (both when
Ω = 10, 000, and DiffGen; it shows that PrivPfC 3%-10%-87% performs reasonably well,
and in fact slightly better than the standard PrivPfC when ǫ ≥ 0.2.
3.3.4 Analyses of Sources of Errors
We have seen that PrivPfC outperforms the other data-publishing methods such as Dif-
fGen and PrivBayes. The key difference in PrivPfC is that we choose the grid g in a single
step, instead of arriving at the final grid through a series of decisions. For example, Diff-
Gen iteratively chooses the attributes and ways to partition them, and PrivBayes iteratively
builds a Bayesian network. There are two reasons why such an iterative approach does
not perform well. The first is that the decisions made in each iteration may be sub-optimal
because of the randomization necessary for satisfying differential privacy. The second is
that even if the decision made in each iteration is locally optimal, the combination of them
is not globally optimal. To see to what extent the latter factor affects accuracy, we con-
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Figure 3.10.: Analyses of PrivPfC, DiffGen and PrivBayes by decision tree classification.
x-axis: privacy budget ǫ in log-scale. y-axis: misclassification rate in log-scale.
variants, the decisions in each iteration are performed without any perturbation, but noises
are still added when publishing the counts. We also consider a variant of PrivPfC, called
PrivPfC-SelNF, in which the histogram selection step is noise-free. All these variants are
not private; they are used to understand the source of errors only.
Figure 3.10 reports the experimental results of comparing these methods, using De-
cision Tree. We first observe that PrivPfC-SelNF indeed outperforms PrivPfC, although
the differences tend to be smaller than the difference between PrivPfC and DiffGen. We
also observe that PrivBayes-Struct-NF still performs poorly; in fact, it performs signifi-
cantly worse than PrivPfC. Again, this is not surprising given that the iterative Bayes net-
work construction approach is not designed to optimize one classification task. Similarly
DiffGen-Struct-NF still underperforms PrivPfC. This suggests that the inherent iterative
structure of DiffGen is suboptimal.
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3.3.5 Scalability over Dimensions and Runtime
We study the scalability of dimensions of our algorithm as well as our competitors. This
experiment is performed on the US dataset. First, we sort all of its predictor variables by
their degrees of correlation to the response variable in descending order. The correlation is
measured by the χ2 statistic, which is one of the most effective methods of feature selection
for classification [57], [58]. We then generate the set of datasets with lower number of
dimensions by projecting the US dataset to dimensions defined by the first d − 1 predictor
variables and the response variable, where d = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 47.
Figure 3.11 shows the results. We can see that as the increasing of dimensionality,
PrivPfC, DiffGen and PPH offer stable classification performance. PrivPfC is still the best




















Figure 3.11.: Comparison of PrivPfC, DiffGen, PrivBayes and PPH by varying dimensions
(decision tree classification). ǫ = 0.5. x-axis: dimensions. y-axis: misclassification rate in
log-scale.
We also compare the running time of 4 data publishing algorithms, PrivPfC, DiffGen,
PrivBayes and PPH, on the US dataset with privacy budget 0.05 and 0.5 respectively. Fig-
ure 3.12 shows the comparison results. PrivBayes is the most inefficient one, followed by
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PrivPfC, PPH and DiffGen. By considering runtime comparison results and accuracy com-
parison results (Figure 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7) together, we can see that PrivPfC trades more
runtime for accuracy improvement. From the runtime comparison result, we can also see
that under different privacy budgets, PrivBayes, PrivPfC and PPH have close runtime while
DiffGen needs longer time when the privacy budget gets larger. This is because with more
privacy budget DiffGen is likely to choose finer partitions in attribute taxonomy hierarchy,


















Figure 3.12.: Runtime comparison of PrivPfC, DiffGen, PPH and PrivBayes on decision
tree classification. x-axis: privacy budget. y-axis: runtime in seconds.
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4. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATEK-MEANS CLUSTERING
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, differential privacy [5] has been increasingly adopted as the privacy
notion of choice of data analysis while preserving individual privacy. Several broad classes
of approaches exist for developing differentially private techniques for data analysis. In
this chapter we study differentially private k-means clustering. Clustering analysis plays
an essential role in data analysis tasks. Clustering under differential privacy has also been
studied in [7, 12, 16, 25, 29, 30].
Our study has two goals. The first is to improve the techniques for performing k-means
clustering. The second is to use k-means clustering as a case study to compare several
classes of methods for private data analysis, and to identify the strengths and weaknesses
of these methods.
There are three state-of-the-art differentially private algorithms on k-means clustering.
The first method, which we call DPLloyd, makes the iterative Lloyd algorithm [7, 16] dif-
ferentially private by adding noises to each step. The second method, which we call PGkM,
uses PrivGene [12], a framework for differentially private model fitting based on genetic
algorithms. These two use an iterative optimization approach that tries to gradually im-
prove the choice of the centroids. The third algorithm uses the sample and aggregation
framework [25] and is implemented in the GUPT system [29], which we call GkM. This
algorithm uses a noisy average of the centroids computed from many subsamples of the
dataset.
An alternative approach is to publish a synopsis of the dataset in a way that satisfies
differential privacy. Then one can perform any k-means clustering algorithm on a synthetic
dataset generated from the synopsis. One immediate benefit is that one can run a k-means
clustering algorithm such as the Lloyd on the synthetic dataset many times and choose
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the best, since we are only accessing the synopsis produced while satisfying differential
privacy. This also enables one to select an appropriate k value. An additional benefit is that
one can perform other analysis tasks beyond k-means clustering on the synthetic dataset at
the same time without affecting privacy.
In this chapter, we propose to combine the following differentially private synopsis
algorithms with k-means clustering. The dataset is viewed as a set of points over a d-
dimensional domain, which is divided into M equal-size cells, and a noisy count is ob-
tained from each cell. A key decision is to choose the parameter M . A larger M value
means lower average counts for each cell, and therefore noisy counts are more likely to be
dominated by noises. A smallerM value means larger cells, and therefore one has less ac-






which is derived based on extending the analysis in [31], which aims to minimize errors
when answering rectangular range queries for 2-dimensional data, to higher dimensional
case. We call the resulting k-means algorithm EUGkM, where EUG is for Extended Uni-
form Grid.
We conducted extensive experimental evaluations for these algorithms on 6 datasets
used in the literature as well as 81 datasets that we synthesized by varying the dimension d
from 2 to 10 and the number of clusters from 2 to 10. Our experimental results contradict
findings in the literature. GkM was introduced after DPLloyd and was claimed to have
accuracy advantage over DPLloyd, and PGkM was introduced after and compared GkM.
However, we found that DPLloyd is the best method among these three methods, and GkM
is by far the worst. In the comparison of DPLloyd and GkM in [29], DPLloyd was run using
much larger number of iterations than necessary, and thus perform poorly. We are also able
to explain why DPLloyd is better. Our error analysis shows that errors due to GUPT’s
sample and aggregation approach are asymptotically worse than errors for DPLloyd, as
the number of data points increases. The reason why DPLloyd outperforms PGkM is that
the genetic programming style of PGkM needs more iterations to converge. When making
these algorithms differentially private, the privacy budget is divided among all iterations,
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thus having more iterations means more noise is added to each iteration. Therefore, the
more direct DPLloyd outperforms PGkM.
The most intriguing results are those comparing DPLloyd with EUGkM. For most
datasets, EUGkM performs much better than DPLloyd. However, for a few, DPLloyd
outperforms EUGkM. Through further analytical and empirical analysis, we found that,
while the performance of both algorithms are greatly affected by the two key parameters:
the number of dimensions d and the number of clusters k, the ways they are affected by
these two parameters are different, due to the different structures of these two algorithms.
DPLloyd scales worse when k increases, while EUGkM scales worse when d increases.
An intriguing question is can we further improve upon DPLloyd and EUGkM?We note
that the accuracy of DPLloyd is affected by two key factors: the number of iterations and
the choice of initial centroids. In fact, these two are closely related. If the initially chosen
centroids are very good and close to the true centroids, one only needs perhaps one iteration
to improve it, and this reduction in the number of iterations would mean less noise is added.
This leads us to propose a novel hybrid method that combines the non-interactive EU-
GkM with the single-workload DPLloyd. We first use a portion of the total privacy budget
to run EUGkM, and then use the centroids outputted by EUGkM as the initial centroids
for one round of DPLloyd with the remaining privacy budget. Such a method, however,
may not actually outperform EUGkM, especially when the privacy budget ǫ is small, since
then one round of DPLloyd may actually worsen the centroids. We use our error analysis
formulas to determine whether there is sufficient privacy budget for such a hybrid approach
to outperform EUGkM. We then experimentally validate the effectiveness of the Hybrid
approach.
The hybrid approach is also applicable to other private data analysis tasks which have an
iterative/incremental algorithm structure. For example, a wide range of machine learning
algorithms, such as support vector machines and logistic regression, employ stochastic
gradient descent to train models. When making such algorithms differentially private, there
is always the tradeoff between the quality of the initial values and the number of iterations.
Applying the hybrid approach is potentially beneficial. One can first publish a private
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synopsis of the input data, on which one can find an optimizer, and uses it as the starting
choice for iterative improvement.
In this chapter we advance the state-of-the-art on differentially private data mining in
several ways. First, we have introduced a new non-interactive method, EUGkM, for dif-
ferentially private k-means clustering, which are highly effective and often outperform
the state-of-the-art single-workload methods and non-interactive methods. Second, we
have developed techniques to analyze the error behaviors of DPLloyd and EUGkM. This
kind of empirical error analyses are missed in most differentially private data analysis pa-
pers. Third, based on the error analysis of DPLloyd, we proposed an improved version of
DPLloyd which significantly reduces the clustering error. Fourth, we introduce the novel
concept of hybrid approach to differentially private data analysis, which is so far the best
approach to k-means clustering. We conjecture that such a hybrid approach may prove use-
ful in other analysis tasks as well. Finally, we have extensively evaluated existing methods
for k-means clustering, and analyzed their strengths and weaknesses.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the
DPLloyd approach, systematically analyze its error behavior and propose an improvement
of DPLloyd. In Section 4.3, we describe and analyze other existing single-workload ap-
proaches, GkM and PGkM. In Section 4.4, we describe two non-interactive approaches
UGkM and MkM and derive a new non-interactive approach EUGkM. In Section 4.5 we
study the error behavior of DPLloyd and EUGkM, introduce the hybrid approach. In Sec-
tion 4.6, we show the experimental results on the performance comparison among the
single-workload, non-interactive and the proposed hybrid approaches, and analyze their
strengths and weaknesses.
4.2 Differentially Private Lloyd Algorithm and Its Improvements
In this section, we describe the DPLloyd approach for differentially private k-means




A differentially private version of the Lloyd’s algorithm was first proposed by Blum et
al. [16]. We call this the DPLloyd approach. As shown in Section 2.6.3, DPLloyd differs
from the standard Lloyd algorithm in the following ways. First, Laplace noises are added
to the iterative update steps in the Lloyd algorithm. Second, the number of iterations needs
to be fixed in order to decide how much noise needs to be added in each iteration.
Optimization Issues
The overall structure of DPLloyd is to first select initial values, and then iteratively
improve them. This same algorithmic structure also applies to many other data analysis
tasks, such as linear regression, SVM, etc. When making such a single-workload algorithm
differentially private, there are two important decisions one has to make.
The first decision is how to select the initial values. In the standard, non-private setting,
a purely random choice may suffice, since one could repeat the algorithm multiple times
and choose the best result among them. With privacy constraints, however, running the
single-workload algorithm multiple times results in each run can use only a fraction of the
total privacy budget, and make the results being even less accurate.
The second decision is how many iterations one runs. A large number of iterations
causes too much noises being added. A small number of iterations may be insufficient
for the algorithm to converge. Existing approaches fix a number. However, intuitively the
number of rounds would depend on the available privacy budget ǫ. With a smaller privacy
budget, one should run fewer number of rounds, to avoid the results being overwhelmed by
too much noise.
How to choose these parameters has not been carefully considered in the literature.
In the implementation of DPLloyd in PINQ [27], it is proposed to run 5 iterations, with
equal privacy budget allocation for each round. In [29], comparison of GkM with DPLloyd
was done by running DPLloyd with 20, 80, and 200 iterations, resulting in incorrect claim
that GkM outperforms DPLloyd. Dwork [30] considered the possibility of running k-
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means clustering without knowing the number of rounds in advance, and proposed to use
exponentially decreasing allocation of privacy budgets, i.e., ǫ
2
in the first round, ǫ
4
in the
second round, and so on. This mostly likely results in deteriorating performance when the
number of rounds increases. The main reason is that in later rounds, when one gets closer
to the optimal value, it is desirable to have a larger privacy budget.
Below, we propose an approach to improve the selection of initial centroids for k-means
clustering, design a general framework for deciding the number of iterations and apply it
to improve DPLloyd. The improved version of DPLloyd is called DPLloyd-Impr.
Selecting Initial Centroids
The quality of initial centroids greatly affects the accuracy of DPLloyd. A poor choice
of initial centroids can result in converging to a local optimum that is far from global
optimum, or not converging after the given number of iterations. While many methods
for choosing the initial points have been developed [28], these methods were developed
without the privacy concern and need access to the dataset. In [7], k points at uniform
random from the domain are chosen as the initial centroids. We have observed empirically
that this can perform poorly in some settings, since some randomly chosen initial centroids
are close together. We thus introduce an improved method for choosing initial centroids
that is similar to the concept of sphere packing. Given a radius a, we randomly generate
k centroids one by one such that each new centroid is of distance at least a away from
every corner of the domain [−r, r]d and each new centroid is of distance at least 2a away
from any existing centroid. When a randomly chosen point does not satisfy this condition,
we generate another point. When we have failed repeatedly, e.g. failed over 80% of the
user defined maximum number of tries, we conclude that the radius a is too large, and try
a smaller radius. We use a binary search to find the maximal value for a such that the
process of choosing k centroids succeed. This process depends only on the shape of the
overall domain and not where the data points are, and thus does not affect privacy. The
pseudocode of this algorithm is shown in Algorithm 12.
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Algorithm 12 SPHEREPACKINGINITIALCENTROIDSGENERATION
Input:d: number of dimensions, [−r, r]: dataset range, k: number of clusters
1: radiuslo ← 0.0
2: radiushi ← r
√
d
3: return BINARYSEARCH(k, r, radiuslo, radiushi)
4: Function BINARYSEARCH(k, r, radiuslo, radiushi)
5: while radiuslo < radiushi do
6: radiusmid ← (radiuslo + radiushi)/2
7: numTrials, 〈o1, . . . , ok〉 ← randomly choose k initial centroids with radius
radiusmid in [−r, r]d
8: if numTrials < 3 then
9: radiuslo ← radiusmid
10: else if numTrials > 0.8 ·MAXNUMTRIES then





16: return 〈o1, . . . , ok〉
Optimizing Rounds and Budget Allocation
We introduce the following general approach of determining the number of rounds and
privacy budget allocation. Our approach depends on the ability to analyze the amount
of noise introduced in each round, manifested as the mean squared error (MSE). Given
this, one also specifies a threshold for the maximum MSE. The basic idea is to choose the
number of iterations so that we try to ensure that each iteration’s MSE is no larger than the
threshold, and use a smaller number of rounds if necessary. Below we show how to apply
this idea to DPLloyd.
Error Study of DPLloyd
DPLloyd adds noises to each iteration of updating centroids. We now analyze the mean
squared error (MSE) between noisy centroids and true centroids in one iteration.
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Consider one centroid and its update in one iteration. The true centroid’s i’th dimension
should be oi =
Si
C
, where C is the number of data points in the cluster and Si is the sum
of i’th dimension coordinates of data points in the cluster. Consider the noisy centroid ô;
its i’th dimension is ôi =
Si+∆Si
C+∆C
, where ∆C is the noise added to the count and∆Si is the
noise added to the Si. The MSE is thus:











Derivation based on the above formula gives the following proposition.







Proof Let us first consider the MSE on the i-th dimension.






























The last step holds, because ∆Si and ∆C are independent zero-mean Laplace noises




2]− (E[∆Si])2 = Var (∆Si)
E[(∆C)2] = E[(∆C)2]− (E[∆C])2 = Var (∆C) ,
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where Var (∆Si) and Var (∆C) are the variances of ∆Si and ∆C, respectively.
Suppose that on average
|Si|
2r·C = ρ, where [−r, r] is the range of the i’th dimension. That
is, ρ is the normalized coordinate of i-th dimension of the cluster’s centroid. Furthermore,
suppose that each cluster is about the same size, i.e., C ≈ N
k
. Then, MSE (ôi) can be
approximated as follows:




Var (∆Si) + (2ρr)
2 · Var (∆C)) . (4.2)






Var (∆Si) and Var (∆C) are equal to
2((dr+1)t)2
ǫ2
. From Equation (4.2) we obtain




Var (∆Si) + (2ρr)
2 · Var (∆C)) (4.3)























Proposition 4.2.1 shows that the distortion to the centroid proportional to t2k2d3, while
inversely proportional to (Nǫ)2.
Optimizing Privacy Budget Allocation Within Each Round
An issue specific to DPLloyd and may not be shared by all iterative algorithms is that
within each round of DPLloyd, the privacy budget needs to be divided among the count
and the d sum queries. Suppose ǫ0 is allocated to the count query, and ǫi is allocated to the
sum query for the i-th dimension, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , d. While all dimensions should
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be treated equally, i.e., ǫ1 = ǫ2 = . . . = ǫd, an interesting question is what should be the
right value of ǫi
ǫ0
? The DPLloyd approach allocates the privacy budget according to the
sensitivities of different queries; thus ǫi
ǫ0
= r, assuming that each dimension is normalized
to [−r, r]. Different r values will result in different allocations of privacy budget.
We observe that the analysis in Section 4.2.1 calls for a fixed allocation of ǫi
ǫ0
, in-




Var (∆C) = 2
ǫ20
into Equation (4.3), one obtains
d∑
i=1






Var (∆Si) + (2ρr)














Minimization of the above subject to
∑d
i=1 ǫi + ǫ0 = z can be solved using the method
of Lagrange multipliers, where z is the privacy budget allocated to the current round. The
optimal proportion is





4dρ2, we need an estimation of ρ, the normalized coordinate of i-th
dimension of the cluster’s centroid. We note that 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5. If a cluster includes
points perfectly balanced between the negative side and the positive side, then ρ = 0. If
all points have r (−r) as its i-th coordinate, then ρ = 0.5. We empirically compute ρ from
81 synthetic datasets that are not used for purpose of evaluation. We use ρ = 0.225 in this
chapter, and conjecture that it provides a good enough approximation for most scenarios.
We note that in the DPLloyd approach, if one chooses r = 1, i.e., normalizes each
dimension to the range of [−1, 1], one would allocate the privacy budget with a ratio of
ǫi : ǫ0 = 1 : 1, which is suboptimal in most cases.




Input:D: dataset, d: number of dimensions, [−r, r]: dataset range, k: number of clusters,
IC: set of initial centroids, ǫ: privacy budget
1: {o1, o2, . . . , ok} ← IC
2: Budget allocation ratio γs for sum query, γc for count queries by Eq. 4.7
3: for each j (j = 1, 2, . . . , k) do
4: Cluster Cj ← {xℓ : ‖xℓ − oi‖ ≤ ‖xℓ − oj‖, xℓ ∈ D, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k}
5: 〈oj1, oj2, . . . , ojd〉 ← NOISYCENTROIDUPDATE(d, Cj, γs · ǫ, γc · ǫ)
6: end for
7: return {o1, o2, . . . , ok}
Determining the Number of Rounds
Based on our analysis in Section 4.2.1, we make several observations. First, it makes
no sense to run DPLloyd with a large number of rounds. From Proposition 4.2.1, the dis-





. Thus, running DPLloyd with too many
rounds results in large distortion on the cluster centroids. Second, one should dynamically
determine the number of rounds based on parameters such as N and ǫ, since the distortion
on the centroid is inversely proportional to (Nǫ)2.
By exploiting these observations, we propose a way to determine the number of itera-
tions. We first determine a minimum privacy budget ǫm that needs to be allocated to each
iteration (see below). Then, the privacy budget allocation across the iterations is decided
by the following two cases. Case 1: ǫ ≤ 2ǫm. In this case, the total privacy budget is in-
adequate. If we distribute it to more than 2 iterations, then as stated before the added noise
in each round would easily dominate the centroid improvement. Therefore, we decide that
DPLloyd runs for two iterations only, each with privacy budget of ǫ
2
. Case 2: ǫ > 2ǫm. In
this case, the total privacy budget is able to meet the requirement of assigning minimum
budget to each iteration. We require that the total number of iterations is at most 7. Thus,
the total number of iterations t− = min{ ǫ
ǫm




We now come to the calculation of ǫm. The intuition is that if the centroid improvement
of one iteration is effective, then the MSE value should not be too big. We use the heuristic
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that the MSE of all the centroids improvement should be no more than 0.004 · rd. It follows















i=0 ǫi = ǫ
m. According to the optimized ratio in Equation 4.7, the privacy budget














ǫm, for i = 1, 2, . . . , d.











For the Gowalla dataset, ǫm ≈ 0.011; for the Adult-num dataset, it is approximately equal
to 0.096.
Algorithm 14 summarizes our improvement of DPLloyd.
4.3 Other Approaches
In this section, we describe other existing approaches to differentially private k-means
clustering. Further analyses of them are presented in Section 4.6.
4.3.1 PGkM
PrivGene [12] is a general-purpose differentially private model fitting framework based
on genetic algorithms. Given a datasetD and a fitting-score function f(D, θ) that measures
how well the parameter θ fits the dataset D, the PrivGene algorithm initializes a candidate
set of possible parameters θ and iteratively refines them by mimicking the process of natu-
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Algorithm 14 DPLLOYDIMPROVEMENT
Input:D: dataset, d: number of dimensions, [−r, r]: dataset range, k: number of clusters,
t: number of iterations, IC: set of initial centroids, ǫ: privacy budget
1: if IC is empty then
2: {o1, o2, . . . , ok} ← SPHEREPACKINGINITIALCENTROIDSGENERATION(d, r, k)
3: else
4: {o1, o2, . . . , ok} ← IC
5: end if
6: Compute the minimum budget ǫm by Eq. 4.9
7: if ǫ < 2ǫm then
8: t− ← 2
9: else




12: ǫ′ ← ǫ
t−
13: for Loop t− times do
14: for each j (j = 1, 2, . . . , k) do
15: Cluster Cj ← {xℓ : ‖xℓ − oi‖ ≤ ‖xℓ − oj‖, xℓ ∈ D, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k}
16: 〈oj1, oj2, . . . , ojd〉← DPLLOYDOPTIMIZATIONFORONEITERATION(D, d, [−r, r],
k, {o1, o2, . . . , ok}, ǫ′)
17: end for
18: end for
19: return {o1, o2, . . . , ok}
ral evolution. Specifically, in each iteration, PrivGene uses the exponential mechanism [14]
to privately select from the candidate setm′ parameters that have the best fitting scores, and
generates a new candidate set from the m′ selected parameters by crossover and mutation.
Crossover regards each parameter as an h-dimensional vector. Given two parameter vec-
tors, it randomly selects a number h¯ such that 0 < h¯ < h and splits each vector into the
first h¯ dimensions in the vector and the remaining h− h¯ dimensions (the lower half). Then,
it swaps the lower halves of the two vectors to generate two child vectors. These vectors
are then mutated by adding a random noise to one randomly chosen dimension.
In [12], PGkM is applied to logistic regression, SVM, and k-means clustering. In the
case of k-means clustering, the NICV formula in Equation 2.8, more precisely its non-
normalized version, is used as the fitting function f , and the set of k cluster centroids is
defined as parameter θ. Each parameter is a vector of h = k · d dimensions. Initially, the
88
candidate set is populated with 200 sets of cluster centroids randomly sampled from the
data space, each set containing exactly k centroids. Then, the algorithm runs iteratively
for max{8, (xNǫ)/m′} rounds, where x andm′ are empirically set to 1.25× 10−3 and 10,
respectively, and N is the dataset size.
We call the approach of applying PrivGene to k-means clustering PGkM, which is
similarly to DPLloyd in that it tries to iteratively improve the centroids. However, rather
than maintaining and improving a single set of k centroids, PGkM maintains a pool of
candidates, uses selection to improve their quality, and crossover and mutation to broaden
the pool.
By selecting multiple sets of centroids in each round and applying mutation, PGkM
reduces the chance that the iterative process is stuck in a suboptimal solution. At the same
time, doing this invariably slows down the converging process. At the same time, if one
increases the number of iterations, each iteration becomes highly inaccurate. Thus whether
PGkM is a suitable approach for a problem depends on whether the benefit of PGkM can
compensate for the slow converging speed. Our experimental results in Section 4.6 show
that for k-means clustering, this is not the case and PGkM performs poorly.
4.3.2 GkM
The k-means clustering problem was also used to motivate the sample and aggregate
framework (SAF) for satisfying differential privacy, which was developed in [25, 59], and
implemented in the GUPT system [29].
Given a datasetD and a function f , SAF first partitionsD into ℓ blocks, then it evaluates
f on each of the block, and finally it privately aggregates results from all blocks into a single
one. Since any single tuple inD falls in one and only one block, adding one tuple can affect
at most one block’s result, limiting the sensitivity of the aggregation step. Thus one can
add less noise in the final step to satisfy differential privacy.
As far as we know, GUPT [29] is the only implementation of SAF. Authors of [29]
implemented k-means clustering and used it to illustrate the effectiveness of GUPT.We call
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this algorithm GkM. Given a dataset D, it first partitions D into ℓ blocks D1, D2, . . . , Dℓ.
Then, for each blockDb (1 ≤ b ≤ ℓ), it calculates its k centroids ob,1, ob,2, . . . , ob,k. Finally,
it averages the centroids calculated from all blocks and adds noise. Specifically, the i’th












where ob,ji is the i’th dimension of o
b,j , [mini, maxi] is the estimated output range of i’th
dimension. One half of the total privacy budget is used to estimate this output range, and
the other half is used for adding Laplace noise.
We have found that the implementation downloaded from [60], which uses Equation
(4.10), performed poorly. Analyzing the data closely, we found that mini and maxi often
fall outside of the data range, especially for small ǫ. We slightly modified the code to bound
mini andmaxi to be within the data domain. This does not affect the privacy but is able to
greatly improve the accuracy. In this chapter we use this fixed version.
Here a key parameter is the choice of ℓ. Intuitively, a larger ℓ will result in each block
being very small and unable to preserve the cluster information in the blocks, and a smaller
ℓ, on the other hand, results in large noise added. (Note the inverse dependency on ℓ in
Equation (4.10)). Analysis in [29] suggests to set ℓ = N0.4. Our experimental results,
however, show that the performance of GkM with ℓ = N0.4 is quite poor.
We can analytically show why GkM performs worse than DPLloyd. There are two
sources of errors in GkM. The first is that the cluster centers obtained from different blocks
may not be accurate. Such errors increase when the number of blocks increases, since then
each block has fewer data points and is less likely to have centroids similar to the whole
dataset. The second is due to the added noise in the aggregation step. The MSE due to the
added noise is on the order of k
2d2
ℓ2ǫ2
. Compared with the MSE analysis of DPLloyd, they are




, that is, when each block contains only a small number of data
points. It is unlikely that one could learn k centroids from such small blocks. At the same
time, if one chooses ℓ = N0.4, then MSE will be linear in k
2d2
N0.8ǫ2
, which is much larger
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than that of the DPLloyd method. This seems a fundamental limitation of the sample and
aggregation approach.
4.4 Using a Private Synopsis
Approaches such as DPLloyd and GkM suffer from two limitations. First, often times
the purpose of conducting k-means clustering is to visualize how the data points are parti-
tioned into clusters. The single-workload approaches, however, output only the centroids.
In the case of DPLloyd, one could also obtain the number of data points in each cluster;
however, it cannot provide more detailed information on what shapes data points in the
clusters take. The value of single-workload differentially private k-means clustering is thus
limited. Second, as the privacy budget is consumed by the single-workload method, one
cannot perform any other analysis on the dataset; doing so will violate differential privacy.
An approach where one first generates a synopsis of a dataset using a differentially
private algorithm, and then applies k-means clustering algorithm on the synopsis, avoids
these two limitations. In this chapter, we consider the following synopsis method. Given
a d-dimensional dataset, one partitions the domain intoM equal-width grid cells, and then
releases the noisy count in each cell, by adding Laplace noise to each cell count.
The synopsis consists of a set of cells, each of which has a rectangular bounding box and
a (noisy) count of how many data points are in the bounding box. The synopsis tells only
how many points are in a cell, but not the exact locations of these points. For the purpose
of clustering, we treat all points as if they are at the center of the bounding box. In addition,
these noisy counts might be negative, non-integer, or both. A straightforward solution is to
round the noisy count of a cell to be a non-negative nearest integer and replicate the cell
center as many as the rounded count. This approach, however, may introduce a significant
systematic bias in the clustering result, when many cells in the synopsis are empty or close
to empty and these cells are not distributed uniformly. In this case, simply turning negative
counts to zero can produce a large number of points in those empty areas, which can pull
the centroid away from its true position. We take the approach of keeping the noisy count
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unchanged and adapting the centroid update procedure in k-means to use the cell as a
whole. Specifically, given a cell with center c and noisy count n˜, its contribution to the
centroid is c× n˜. Using this approach, in one cluster, cells who have negative noisy count
can “cancel out” the effect of other cells with positive noise. Therefore, we can have better
clustering performance.
For this method, the key parameter is M , the number of cells. When M is large, the
average count per cell is low, and the noise will have more impact. WhenM is small, each
cell covers a large area, and treating all points as at the center may be inaccurate when the
points are not uniformly distributed. We now describe two existing methods of choosing
M and extend one of them.
4.4.1 MkM
Lei [33] proposed a scheme to release differentially private synopses tailored for the M-









We name the approach of applying the k-means clustering on this synopsis MkM.
4.4.2 UGkM
UG is a simple algorithm proposed in [31] for producing synopsis of 2-dimensional
datasets that can be used to answer rectangular range queries (i.e., how many data points
there are in a rectangular range) with high accuracy. The algorithm partitions the space into
M = m × m equal-width grid cells, and then releases the noisy count in each cell. It is
observed that for counting queries, a larger M value results in higher errors because more
noises are added, and a smallerM value results in higher errors due to the fact that points
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within cells may be distributed nonuniformly, and queries including a portion of these cells









It has been shown thatUG performs quite well for answering rectangular range queries [31].
UG can be easily extended to d-dimensional dataset by setting m = d
√
M . We use UGkM
to represent the UG-based k-means clustering scheme.
4.4.3 EUGkM
We now analyze the choice of M for higher-dimensional case. Given a d-dimensional
rectangular range counting query, suppose that act is its precise answer and est is its es-
timated answer using the released noisy counts of the cells. We use mean squared error
(MSE) to measure the accuracy of est with respect to act. That is,
MSE (est) = E
[
(est− act)2] = Var (est) + (Bias (est))2,
where Var (est) is the variance of est and Bias (est) is its bias.
There are two error sources when computing est. First, Laplace noises are added to cell
counts to satisfy differential privacy. This results in the variance of est. Since counting a





is added. Thus, the noisy count has
the variance of 2
ǫ2
. Suppose that the given counting query covers α portion of the total M
cells in the data space. Then, Var (est) = α 2M
ǫ2
. Second, the given counting query may
not fully contain the cells that fall on the border of the query rectangle. To estimate the
number of points in the intersection between the query rectangle and the border cells, it
assumes that data are uniformly distributed. This results in the bias of est, which depends
on the number of tuples in the border cells. The border of the given query consists of 2d
hyper rectangles, each being (d − 1)-dimensional. The number of cells falling on a hyper
rectangle is in the order of M
d−1










. Therefore, we estimate the bias of est with respect to one hyper












. Summing the variance and the squared bias, it follows that






















. We name the above extended approach as EUG (extended uniform grid-
ing approach). We use EUGkM to represent the EUG-based k-means clustering scheme.
The algorithm of EUGkM is shown in Algorithm 15.
4.5 The Hybrid Approach
As we will show in Section 4.6, DPLloyd still under-performs EUGkM in most set-
tings. Recall that EUGkM publishes a private synopsis of the the dataset, and thus enables
other analysis to be performed on the dataset, beyond k-means. An intriguing question is
“Whether one can do better for k-means clustering?” In particular, can we further improve
DPLloyd? Recall that there are two key issues that greatly affect the accuracy of DPLloyd:
the number of iterations and the choice of initial centroids. In fact, these two are closely
related. If the initially chosen centroids are very good and close to the true centroids, one
only needs perhaps just one iteration to improve it, and this reduction in the number of
iterations would mean less noise is added. Now if only we have a method to choose really
good centroids in a differentially private way, then we can use part (e.g., half) of the privacy
budget to get those initial centroids, and the remaining privacy budget to run one iteration
of DPLloyd to further improve it.
In fact, we do have such a method. EUGkM does it. This leads us to propose a hybrid
method that combines the synopsis-based EUGkM with the single-workload DPLloyd. We
94
Algorithm 15 EUGKM
Input:D: dataset, N : dataset size, d: number of dimensions, [−r, r]: dataset range, k:
number of clusters, IC: set of initial centroids, ǫ: privacy budget
1: if IC is empty then
2: {o1, o2, . . . , ok} ← SPHEREPACKINGINITIALCENTROIDSGENERATION(d, r, k)
3: else








7: Construct grid g by partitioning data space [−r, r]d intoM equal width cells
8: Construct noisy histogram hˆ by projecting dataset D into grid g
9: for each cell c ∈ hˆ do
10: nˆc ← nc + Lap(1/ǫ)
11: end for
12: repeat
13: for each j (j = 1, 2, . . . , k) do
14: Cluster Cj ← {cℓ : ‖cℓ − oi‖ ≤ ‖cℓ − oj‖, cell center cℓ ∈ hˆ, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k}
15: count←∑cℓ∈Cj nˆcℓ













21: until No more changes on cluster centroids
22: return Cluster centroids {o1, o2, . . . , ok} and noisy synopsis hˆ
first use a portion of the privacy budget to run EUGkM, and then use the centroids outputted
by EUGkM as the initial centroids for one round of DPLloyd. Such a method, however,
may not actually outperform EUGkM, especially when the privacy budget ǫ is small, since
then one round of DPLloyd may actually worsen the centroids. Therefore, when ǫ is small,
we should stick to the EUGkM method, and only when ǫ is large enough should we adopt
the EUGkM+DPLloyd approach. In order to determine what ǫ is large enough, we analyze
how the errors depend on the various parameters in DPLloyd and in EUGkM.
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4.5.1 Error Study of EUGkM
Non-interactive approach partitions a dataset into a grid of M uniform cells. Then,
it releases private synopses for the cells, and runs k-means clustering on the synopses to
return the cluster centroids. Similar to the error analysis for DPLloyd, we analyze theMSE.
Let o be the true centroid of a cluster, and ô be its estimator computed by a non-interactive
approach. The MSE between ô and o is composed of two error sources. First, the count in
each cell is inaccurate after adding Laplace noise. This results in the variance (i.e., Var (ô))
of ô from its expectation E [ô]. Second, we no longer have the precise positions of data
points, and only assume that they occur at the center in a cell. Thus, the expectation of ô is
not equal to o, resulting in a bias (i.e., Bias (ô)). The MSE is the combination of these two
errors,
MSE (ô) = Var (ô) + (Bias (ô))2 (4.14)
Analyzing the variance. We assume that each cluster has a volume that is 1
k
of the total
volume of the data space, and has the shape of a cube. In d-dimensional case, the width
of the cube is w = 2rd√k . Suppose that the geometric center
1 of the cube is τi. Let T be the
set of cells included in the cluster. For each cell t ∈ T , we use ct to denote the number of
tuples in t, ti to denote the i’th dimension coordinate of the center of cell t, and νt to denote
the noise added to the cell size. Let ôi be the i-th dimension of the noisy centroid. Then,
the variance of ôi is















t∈T ((ti − τi)2 · Var (ct + νt)) .
1Note that this is not the cluster centroid.
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In the above, the first step follows because τi as the cube geometric center is a constant.
The last step is derived by assuming
∑
t∈T (ct + νt) ≈ C, that is, the noisy cluster size is
approximately equal to the original cluster size C.
We can see that within the cube, different cells’ contribution to the variance is not
the same. Basically, the closer a cell is to the cube center, the less its contribution. The
contribution is proportional to the squared distance to the cube center. We thus approximate
the variance as follows:





















In the above integral, x in the first term is the distance from a cell center to the cube center
(i.e., ti − τi). The second term M(2r)d is the number of cells per unit volume, and wd−1 is the
volume of the (d − 1)-dimensional plane that has a distance of x to the cube center. The
last term 2
ǫ2
is the variance of the cell size (i.e., Var (ct + νt)). Suppose that clusters are of
equal size, that is, C = N
k
. Then, the variance of the noisy centroid by summing all the d
dimensions is














2+d . Plugging it into Equation 4.15, we get that the variance of EUGkM is
inversely proportional to (Nǫ)
4
2+d .
Analyzing the bias . Let xi be the i’th dimension coordinate of a tuple x. Then, the bias
of ôi is



















where the last step is developed by approximating
∑
t∈T (ct + νt) to the cluster size C.
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The bias developed in the above formula is dependent on data distribution. Its precise
estimation requires to access real data. We thus only estimate its upper bound. Let qi =
ti − xi. Non-interactive approach partitions each dimension into d
√
M intervals of equal
length. Hence, qi falls in the range of [− rd√M ,
r
d√M ], and the upper bound of Bias (ôi) is
r
d√M . Summing all the d dimensions, we obtain the upper bound of squared bias of noisy
centroid






The estimation shows that the upper bound of squared bias decreases as a function of
M
2
d . This is consistent with the expectation. AsM increases, the data space is partitioned
into finer-grained cells. Therefore, the distance between a tuple in a cell to the cell center
decreases on average.
Comparing DPLloyd and EUGkM. For DPLloyd, its MSE is inversely proportional






2+d into Equation 4.15 and Inequality 4.16, it follows that the MSE
of EUGkM is inversely proportional to (Nǫ)
4
2+d . Therefore, the MSE of DPLloyd drops
much faster than that of EUGkM as ǫ increases or the dataset size N increases.
The MSE of EUGkM is inversely proportional to (Nǫ)
4
2+d . Thus, it increases exponen-
tially as a function of d. Instead, from Equation 4.5, it follows that the MSE of DPLloyd
has only cubic growth with respect to d. Therefore, DPLloyd is more scalable to d than
EUGkM.
In Section 4.6.2, we will demonstrate the above analysis well explains the empirical
performance for DPLloyd and EUGkM.
4.5.2 Hybrid Approach
Our hybrid approach combines EUGkM and DPLloyd. Given a dataset and privacy
budget ǫ, the hybrid approach first checks whether it overtakes the DPLloyd method and
also the EUGkM method. If this is not the case, the hybrid approach simply falls back to
EUGkM. Otherwise, the hybrid approach allocates a portion of privacy budget to EUGkM
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to output a synopsis and find k intermediary centroids that work well for the synopsis.
Then, it runs DPLloyd for one iteration using the remaining privacy budget to refine these
k centroids. The hybrid algorithm finally outputs a noisy synopsis as well as the cluster
centroids. The full algorithm of the hybrid approach is in Algorithm 16.
We use MSE to heuristically determine the conditions, on which the hybrid approach
overtakes the DPLloyd method and also the EUGkM method. Basically, we require that
the MSE of the hybrid approach be smaller than those of the other two approaches, since
smaller MSE implies smaller error to the cluster centroid. From Equation 4.5, it follows
that the MSE of DPLloyd with full privacy budget is







The MSE of the EUGkM method consists of two parts, the variance and the bias. The










3× (10) 2d2+d (Nǫ) 42+d
. (4.18)







Suppose that in the Hybrid approach, f portion of the total privacy budget ǫ is allocated
to the EUGkM part, we model the MSE of the hybrid approach,
MSEHybrid(ǫ, f) = ω1 · VarEUGkM(fǫ) + ω2 · BiasEUGkM(fǫ)
+ ω3 ·MSEDPLloyd((1− f)ǫ, t = 1). (4.20)
The LHS of Eq (4.20) is the the best actual MSE values that the hybrid approach can
achieve, while the RHS of Eq (4.20) are theoretical values of the EUGkM’s variance, bias
and DPLloyd’s MSE. We use linear regression to estimate the parameters of the above error
model on the ideal set of synthetic datasets (Synthe-PT dataset). After building the linear
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regression model, we have ω1 = 0.14, ω2 = −0.0019 and ω3 = 0.42. Since the parameter
for the BiasEUGkM(fǫ) is very small, we remove it from the regression model.
Algorithm 16 Hybrid Method for k-means Clustering
Input:D: dataset, N : dataset size, d: number of dimensions, [−r, r]: dataset range, k:
number of clusters, IC: set of initial centroids , ǫ: privacy budget
1: Optimize Eq (4.20) to get the bestMSEHybrid and the best allocation ratio f
2: ifMSEHybrid(ǫ) < VarEUGkM(ǫ) then
3: Cinter, hˆ← EUGKM(D,N, d, [−r, r], k, ∅, f · ǫ)
4: Cfinal ← DPLLOYDOPTIMIZATIONFORONEITERATION(D, d, [−r, r], k, Cinter, (1−
f)ǫ)
5: else
6: Cfinal, hˆ← EUGKM(D,N, d, [−r, r], k, ∅, ǫ)
7: end if
8: return Cfinal
4.6 Performance and Analysis
Table 4.1.: Descriptions of datasets.
Dataset Number tuples Number of dimensions Number of clusters
S1 5,000 2 15
Gowalla 107,091 2 5
TIGER 16,281 2 2
Image 34,112 3 3
Adult-num 48,841 6 5
Lifesci 26,733 10 3
Synthe 10,000 + O {2, 3, . . . , 10} {2, 3, . . . , 10}
Synthe-PT 10,000 {2, 3, . . . , 10} {2, 3, . . . , 10}




Table 4.2.: Summary of differentially private k-means methods
Methods Description
Non-interactive
EUGkM Our proposed method to release synopsis for k-means under DP.
UG [31] DP release synopsis for answering rectangular range queries on 2D data.
MkM [33] DP release synopsis tailored for the M-estimator.
Interactive
DPLloyd [16] DP Lloyd algorithm.
DPLloyd Impr Our proposed improvement of DPLloyd.
PGkM [12] Private model fitting based on genetic algorithms.
































































































(e) TIGER [d = 2, k = 2] (f) Lifesci [d = 10, k = 3]
Figure 4.1.: The comparison of DPLloyd-Impr, PGkM, GkM, EUGkM, UGkM and MkM
by varying the privacy budget ǫ. x-axis: privacy budget ǫ in log-scale. y-axis: NICV in
log-scale.
In this section, we compare and analyze the performance of the seven methods de-
scribed in Table 5.2.
4.6.1 Evaluation Methodology
We experimented with six external datasets and two sets of syntheticly generated











































































(e) TIGER [d = 2, k = 2] (f) Lifesci [d = 10, k = 3]
Figure 4.2.: The close-up view of the comparison of DPLloyd-Impr, DPLloyd, EUGkM,
and UGkM by varying the privacy budget ǫ. x-axis: privacy budget ǫ in log-scale. y-axis:
NICV in log-scale.
to study the performance of clustering schemes. S1 contains 5,000 tuples and 15 Gaus-
sian clusters. The Gowalla dataset contains the user checkin locations from the Gowalla
location-based social network whose users share their checking-in time and locations (lon-
gitude and latitude). We sample one locaiton of each user ID and obtain a 2D dataset of
107,091 tuples. We set the number of clusters, k = 5, for this dataset. The third dataset is
























































































































































































(g) UGkM (h) Hybrid (i) GkM-3K
Figure 4.3.: The heatmap by varying k and d on the Synthe datasets with ǫ = 1.0.
cally Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing) dataset [62]. It contains the GPS
coordinates of road intersections in the states of Washington and New Mexico. The fourth
is Image [61], a 3D dataset with 34,112 RGB vectors. We set k = 3 for it. We also use the
well known Adult dataset [52]. We use its six numerical attributes, and set k = 5. The last
dataset is Lifesci. It contains 26,733 records and each of them consists of the top 10 prin-
cipal components for a chemistry or biology experiment. As previous approaches [12, 29],
we set k = 3. Table 4.1 summarizes the datasets. For all the datasets, we normalize the
domain of each attribute to [-1.0, 1.0].
We generate two sets of synthetic datasets. The first set of synthetic datasets, which
we call Synthe, is generated by using the clusterGeneration [63] R package. It is designed
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for generating cluster datasets with specified degree of separation which is a quantitative
measure of closeness between any cluster and its nearest neighboring cluster. Besides,
the clusterGeneration package can generate clusters with arbitrary diameters, shapes and
orientations. In this chapter, we generate 81 dataset by varying k and d from 2 to 10. We fix
the dataset size to 10,000 and distribute them into k clusters with size proportional to the
ratio 1 : 2 : . . . : k. We also inject few outliers whose number is uniformly sampled from
[0, 100]. For each dataset, we randomly sample its degree of separation from [0.16, 0.26],
which means from clusters with small overlapping to separated-but-close clusters.
The second set of synthetic dataset is mainly for tuning parameters of the EUGkM
algorithm. We fix the dataset size to be 10,000, and vary k and d from 2 to 10 respectively.
For each dataset, k well separated Gaussian clusters with equal size are generated. We call
the second set of synthetic dataset as the Synthe-PT set, where PT stands for parameter
tuning.
Implementations for DPLloyd and GkM were downloaded from [27] and [60], respec-
tively. The source code of PGkM [12] was shared by the authors. We implemented EU-
GkM, UGkM and MkM.
Configuration. Each algorithm outputs k centroids o = {o1, o2, · · · , ok}. The quality of
the centroids o is evaluated by the Normalized Intra-Cluster Variance (NICV) (Eq.2.8).
We note that since both DPLloyd, EUGkM, UGkM and MkM use Lloyd-style iteration,
they are affected by the choice of initial centroids. In addition, all algorithms have random
noises added somewhere to satisfy differential privacy. To conduct a fair comparison, we
need to carefully average out such randomness effects. GkM and PGkM do not take a set
of initial centroids as input. GkM divides the input dataset into multiple blocks, and for
each block invokes the standard k-means implementation from the Scipy package [64] with
a different set of initial centroids to get the result, and finally aggregates the outputs for all
the blocks. We run GkM and PGkM 100 times and report the average result.
DPLloyd-Impr generates 30 sets of initial centroids by using the proposed sphere pack-
ing method in Section 4.2.1. We run DPLloyd-Impr 100 times on each set of initial cen-
troids, and report the average of the 3,000 NICV values as the final evaluation of DPLloyd-
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Impr. For DPLloyd, we randomly generate 30 sets of initial centroids and use the same
way to compute the averaged NICV values.
Algorithms based on a private synopsis (such as EUGkM) have the advantage that once
a synopsis is published, one can run k-means clustering with as many sets of initial cen-
troids as one wants and choose the result that has the best performance relative to the
synopsis. In our experiments, given a synopsis, we use the same 30 sets of initial cen-
troids as those generated for the DPLloyd-Impr method. For each set, we run clustering
and output a set of k centroids. Among all the 30 sets of output centroids, we select the
one that has the lowest NICV relative to the synopsis rather than to the original dataset.
This process ensures selecting the set of output centroids satisfies differential privacy. We
then compute the NICV of this selected set relative to the original dataset, and take it as the
resulting NICV with respect to the synopsis. To deal with the randomness introduced by
the process of generating synopsis, we generate 10 different synopses and take the average
of the resulting NICV values.
For EUGkM, we set the the parameter θ = 10. We experimentally compare the EU-
GkM’s performance on different θ choices and find that θ = 10 for EUGkM works well
in most cases. This parameter tuning for EUGkM is performed on the Synthe-PT dataset.
Therefore, the following evaluation of EUGkM on the Synthe dataset strictly satisfies dif-
ferential privacy, since the parameter is determined on an independent set of datasets.
As the baseline, we run standard k-means algorithm [24] over the same 30 sets of initial
centroids generated in DPLloyd-Impr and take the minimum NICV among all the 30 runs.
4.6.2 Experimental Results.
Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2 report the results for the 6 external datasets. For these, we vary ǫ
from 0.05 to 2.0 and plot the NICV curves for the methods listed in Table 5.2. This enables
us to see how these algorithms perform under different privacy budgets.
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Fig. 4.3 reports the results on the Synthe datasets. For these, we fix ǫ = 1.0 and report
the difference of NICV values between each approach and the baseline. This enables us to
see the scalability of these algorithms when k and d increase.
Among approaches not using a synopsis, DPLloyd-Impr has the best performance in
most cases. It also outperforms DPLloyd in most cases. For synopsis-based approaches,
both EUGkM and UGkM clearly outperform MkM, especially for small ǫ values. EUGkM
and UGkM has close performance on the low dimensional datasets. As the dimensionality
increases, the advantage of EUGkM to UGkM becomes obvious. Comparing DPLloyd-
Impr and EUGkM (Fig. 4.2), we observe that in the four low dimensional external datasets
(S1, Gowalla, TIGER and Image), EUGkM clearly outperforms DPLloyd-Impr at small ǫ
value and their gap becomes smaller as ǫ increases. However, in the two high dimensional
datasets (Adult-num and Lifesci), DPLloyd-Impr outperforms EUGkM almost in all given
privacy budgets. The similar observations can also be found in Fig. 4.3.
Fig. 4.3 also exhibits the effects of the number of clusters and the number of dimen-
sions. The EUGkM’s performance is more sensitive to the increase of dimension, while
DPLloyd-Impr gets worse quickly as the number of clusters increases. In addition, Fig-
ure 4.4 shows the difference of EUGkM’s performance on the synthetic dataset for param-
eter tuning under different θ choices. We can see that setting θ = 10 for EUGkM works
well in most cases.
The empirical performance of DPLloyd and EUGkM in Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3 can be
well explained by our theoretical analysis in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.5.1. Recall that











. This explains why the NICV of DPLloyd, which is inversely proportional to
(Nǫ)2, drops much faster than that of EUGkM as ǫ grows in Fig. 4.2. It also explains
why DPLloyd has better performance on ‘big’ dataset (e.g., the TIGER dataset). This also
explains that, as the dimensionality of dataset increases, DPLloyd outperforms EUGkM





















































































































(d) EUGkM θ = 20 (e) EUGkM θ = 50 (f) EUGkM θ = 100
Figure 4.4.: The heatmap by varying k and d on the Synthe-PT datasets. ǫ = 1.0. Varying
the θ value in EUGkM.
4.6.3 Performance of the Hybrid Approach
We now compare the hybrid approach with EUGkM and DPLloyd. The configuration
for EUGkM and DPLloyd is the same as in Section 4.6.1. For the hybrid approach, we
run EUGkM 10 times to output 10 sets of intermediate centroids. Then we run DPLloyd
10 times on each intermediate result. We finally report the average of 100 NICV values.
Fig. 4.5 gives the results on the six external datasets. In low dimensional datasets (S1,
Gowalla, TIGER, and Image), the hybrid approach simply falls back to EUGkM for small
ǫ value. When ǫ increases, both the hybrid approach and EUGkM converge to the baseline
with the former having slightly better performance. For example, in the Gowalla dataset
for ǫ = 0.7, the average NICV of the hybrid approach is 0.02172 and that of EUGkM is
0.02174.
In higher dimensional datasets (Adult-num and Lifesci), the hybrid approach outper-
forms the other two approaches in most cases. It is worse than DPLloyd only for a few
small ǫ values, on which it falls back to EUGkM. There are two possible reasons. The
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first is that the MSE analysis assumes that datasets are well clustered and each cluster has
equal size, but the real datasets are skewed. For example, the baseline approach partitions
the Adult-num dataset into 5 clusters, in which the biggest cluster contains 13,894 tuples
and the smallest contains 3,160 tuples. The second is that we use the variance of EUGkM
as the lower bound of its MSE. Thus, it is possible that the MSE of the hybrid approach
(approximated by the MSE of one-iteration DPLloyd with half privacy budget) is larger
than the variance of EUGkM, but actually smaller than its MSE. In such cases, the hybrid
approach gives lower NICV if it does not fall back to EUGkM. For example, on the Adult-
num dataset for ǫ = 0.05, the hybrid approach of falling back to EUGkM has the NICV of
0.370, while its NICV is 0.244, if it applies EUGkM plus one-iteration of DPLloyd.
We also evaluate the hybrid approach using the Synthe datasets as generated in Sec-
tion 4.6.1. Fig. 4.3 clearly shows that the hybrid approach is more scalable than EUGkM
with respect to both k and d. This confirms the effectiveness of the hybrid approach.
4.6.4 The Analysis of the GkM Approach
From Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.3, it is clear that GkM is always much worse than others. There
are two sources of errors for GkM. One is that GkM is aggregating centroids computed from
the subsets of data, and this aggregation may be inaccurate even without adding noise. The
other is that the noise added according to Equation (4.10) may be too large. We find that
setting ℓ = N0.4 in GkM, which corresponds to block size of N0.6, is far from optimal, as
the error GkM is dominated by that from the noise, and is much higher than the error due
to sample and aggregation.
Fig. 4.6 shows the effect of varying block size from around N0.1 to N on the two
sources of errors. In Fig. 4.6, we show error from GkM, error from using the aggregation
without noise (SAG), and error from adding noise computed by Equation 4.10) to the best
known centroids (Noise). From the figure, it is clear that setting ℓ = N0.4, which corre-
sponds to block size of N0.6 is far from optimal, as the error GkM is dominated by that































































(e) Adult-num [d = 6, k = 5] (f) Lifesci [d = 10, k = 3]
Figure 4.5.: The comparison of the Hybrid approach with EUGkM and DPLloyd-Impr.
x-axis: privacy budget ǫ in log-scale. y-axis: NICV in log-scale.
we observed that as the block size decreases the error of GkM keeps decreasing, until when
the block size gets close to k. It seems that even though many individual blocks result
in poor centroids, aggregating these relatively poor centroids can result in highly accurate
centroids. This effect is most pronounced in the Tiger dataset, which consists of two large
clusters. The two centroids computed from each small block can be approximately viewed
as choosing one random point from each cluster. When averaging these centroids, one gets








































































(e) TIGER [d = 2, k = 2] (f) Lifesci [d = 10, k = 3]
Figure 4.6.: The analysis of the GkM Approach. x-axis: block size exponent in log-scale,
y-axis: NICV in log-scale.
4.6.5 The Analysis of the PGkM Approach
PGkM is a stochastic k-means method based on genetic algorithms. A stochastic
method converges to global optimum [65]. On the contrary, DPLloyd is a gradient de-
scent method derived from the standard Lloyd’s algorithm [24], which may reach local
optimum. However, PGkM is still inferior to DPLloyd in Fig. 4.3.
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There are two possible reasons. First, a stochastic approach typically takes a ‘larger’
number of iterations to converge [65]. We compare the Lloyd’s algorithm with Gene
(i.e., the non-private version of PGkM without considering differential privacy) in terms
of NICV over the number of iterations in Fig. 4.7. For Lloyd, we reuse the initial centroids
generated in Section 4.6.1. Given a dataset, we run Lloyd on the 30 sets of initial centroids
generated for the dataset, and report the average NICV. Generally, Gene overtakes Lloyd as
the number of iterations increases and finally converges to the global optimum. However,
Lloyd improves its performance much faster than Gene in the first few iterations, and con-
verges to the global optimal (or local optimum) more quickly. For example, in the Image
dataset, Lloyd reaches the best baseline after three iterations, while the Gene needs more
than 10 iterations to achieve the same.
The second reason is that the low privacy budget allocated to select a parameter (i.e.,
a set of k cluster centroids) from the candidate set. In each iteration PGkM selects 10 pa-
rameters, and the total number of iterations is at least 8. Thus, the privacy budget allocated
to select a single parameter is at most ǫ/80. Therefore, PGkM has reasonable performance
only for big ǫ value.
4.6.6 The Analysis of the EUGkM, UGkM and MkM Approaches
The difference between of the three synopsis-based methods, EUGkM, UGkM and





2+d , the UGkM











. Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.3
show that the performance of UGkM and EUGkM are superior to that of MkM. An impor-
tant reason is that MkM does not take ǫ as a factor in M . Thus, it is nonadaptive to the
variation of ǫ. This explains why EUGkM and UGkM perform much better than MkM for
small ǫ values. On the other hand, although UGkM considers the impact of the privacy bud-
get ǫ, it does not produce large enough grids for the high dimensional data. This explains




























































(e) TIGER [d = 2, k = 2] (f) Lifesci [d = 10, k = 3]
Figure 4.7.: The comparison of the convergence rate of the genetic algorithm based k-
means and Lloyd algorithm. x-axis: number of iterations in log-scale, y-axis: NICV in
log-scale.
4.6.7 Estimating the Number of Clusters.
In cluster analysis, an important problem is to estimate the number of clusters, which
has a deterministic effect on the clustering results. Such problem becomes more prominent
in the differential privacy setting, since the data analyst cannot access the private database
as many times as she/he wants.
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Our EUGkM approach can address this problem. Several heuristics and statistics [66,
67] have been proposed to determine the number of clusters k automatically. Suppose we
have a list of candidate values of k and one statistics φ for determining the best k. Once
an EUGkM synopsis is published, we evaluate φ for each candidate k value on this noisy
synopsis. The k value with the best φ score will be selected for the following k-means
clustering. All the operations are performed on the released EUGkM synopsis. So the
estimation process satisfies the differential privacy. This is another advantage of using a
private synopsis.
We also experimentally evaluate the above method on the six external datasets and on
six privacy budget values. This method gives very accurate estimations on the k values
under most of the privacy budget settings. We omit the experimental results for space
reasons.
Fig. 4.8 presents the running time of DPLloyd and EUGkM on the six external datasets.
We follow the same experiment configuration as in Section 4.6.1. As expected, the running
time of DPLloyd is much lower than that of EUGkM. This is because EUGkM has to run
k-means clustering over 30 sets of initial centroids and output the centroids with the best
NICV relative to the noisy synopsis. Another reason is that DPLloyd sets the number of
iterations to 5 while EUGkM runs k-means clustering until converge.
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Table 4.3.: Likelihood of the Top-4 Selected k values based on RT-validity over S1 and Gowalla datasets.
Dataset
ǫ
Top-1 Top-2 Top-3 Top-4
k Range k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity
S1 0.05 16 0.71 0.105676 15 0.28 0.103682 14 0.01 0.087395
[2, 16] 0.1 7 0.38 0.163604 15 0.29 0.156305 6 0.18 0.162932 4 0.11 0.172983
0.3 14 0.59 0.12504 15 0.29 0.101673 13 0.07 0.151193 6 0.02 0.163395
0.5 14 0.62 0.112746 15 0.26 0.084299 16 0.09 0.084636 13 0.03 0.124349
1.0 14 0.51 0.098129 15 0.49 0.067993
2.0 15 0.99 0.066126 14 0.01 0.09665
∞ 15 0.061424 14 0.092348 13 0.116655 10 0.15266
Gowalla 0.05 5 0.93 0.046851 4 0.04 0.048147 6 0.03 0.047906
[2, 6] 0.1 5 0.98 0.045948 6 0.02 0.044983
0.3 5 0.99 0.04394 6 0.01 0.04508
0.5 5 0.99 0.043698 6 0.01 0.043858
1.0 5 0.99 0.044303 6 0.01 0.043972
2.0 5 0.99 0.044324 6 0.01 0.044382




Table 4.4.: Likelihood of the Top-4 Selected k values based on RT-validity over the TIGER and Image datasets.
Dataset
ǫ
Top-1 Top-2 Top-3 Top-4
k Range k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity
TIGER 0.05 2 0.98 0.013056 3 0.01 0.016129 4 0.01 0.000899
[2, 4] 0.1 2 1.0 0.01295
0.3 2 1.0 0.012226
0.5 2 1.0 0.01224
1.0 2 1.0 0.012206
2.0 2 1.0 0.012214
∞ 2 0.012178 4 0.240427 3 0.309628
Image 0.05 2 0.86 0.112783 3 0.14 0.113939
[2, 4] 0.1 2 0.72 0.108702 3 0.28 0.107116
0.3 2 0.78 0.109119 3 0.22 0.1076
0.5 2 0.63 0.10737 3 0.37 0.104306
1.0 2 0.54 0.107542 3 0.46 0.104778
2.0 3 0.54 0.105789 2 0.46 0.108082




Table 4.5.: Likelihood of the Top-4 Selected k values based on RT-validity over the Adult-num and Lifesci datasets.
Dataset
ǫ
Top-1 Top-2 Top-3 Top-4
k Range k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity k Likelihood Validity
Adult-num 0.05 2 0.92 0.061897 3 0.05 0.088172 5 0.02 0.3036 4 0.01 0.04727
[2, 6] 0.1 2 0.87 0.059629 3 0.08 0.133769 4 0.04 0.072274 6 0.01 0.357226
0.3 2 0.89 0.062967 3 0.09 0.233581 4 0.01 0.059019 6 0.01 0.367765
0.5 2 0.84 0.071696 5 0.06 0.396922 3 0.05 0.110833 6 0.03 0.481508
1.0 2 0.81 0.062337 3 0.07 0.152268 4 0.07 0.339829 6 0.04 0.43002
2.0 2 0.82 0.072643 3 0.07 0.099015 5 0.05 0.372042 6 0.05 0.479522
∞ 2 0.090091 3 0.436318 6 0.464136 5 0.471094
Lifesci 0.05 7 0.4 0.820997 6 0.32 0.788941 5 0.11 0.762209 4 0.06 0.790328
[2, 7] 0.1 7 0.76 0.839943 6 0.22 0.882122 5 0.01 0.833441 4 0.01 1.044702
0.3 7 0.68 0.94046 6 0.21 0.936626 5 0.1 0.880875 3 0.01 0.822615
0.5 7 0.68 0.991935 6 0.23 0.978901 5 0.07 1.019253 4 0.02 1.020965
1.0 7 0.43 0.96385 6 0.29 0.977027 5 0.21 0.974339 2 0.05 0.350502
2.0 7 0.41 0.990653 6 0.38 0.998312 5 0.14 0.984321 4 0.05 0.949489
∞ 6 0.979265 5 1.036223 4 1.04051 7 1.055249
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5. UNDERSTANDING THE SPARSE VECTOR TECHNIQUE
5.1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) is increasingly being considered the privacy notion of choice
for privacy-preserving data analysis and publishing in the research literature. In this chapter
we study the Sparse Vector Technique (SVT), a basic technique for satisfying DP, which
was first proposed by Dwork et al. [23] and later refined in [19] and [17], and used in [68–
72]. Compared with other techniques for satisfying DP, SVT has the unique quality that
one can output some query answers without apparently paying any privacy cost. More
specifically, in SVT one is given a sequence of queries and a certain threshold T , and
outputs a vector indicating whether each query answer is above or below T ; that is, the
output is a vector {⊥,⊤}ℓ, where ℓ is the number of queries answered, ⊤ indicates that the
corresponding query answer is above the threshold and ⊥ indicates below. SVT works by
first perturbing the threshold T and then comparing each perturbed individual query answer
against the noisy threshold. When one expects that the predominant majority of queries are
on one side, e.g., below the threshold, one can use SVT so that while each output of ⊤
(which we call a positive outcome) consumes some privacy budget, each output of ⊥
(negative outcome) consumes none. That is, with a fixed privacy budget and a given level
of noise added to each query answer, one can keep answering queries as long as the number
of ⊤’s does not exceed a pre-defined cutoff point.
This ability to avoid using any privacy budget for queries with negative outcomes is
very powerful for the interactive setting, where one answers a sequence of queries with-
out knowing ahead of the time what these queries are. Some well-known lower-bound
results [5, 20–22] suggest that “one cannot answer a linear, in the database size, number of
queries with small noise while preserving privacy” [23]. This limitation can be bypassed
using SVT, as in the iterative construction approach in [17, 19, 68]. In this approach, one
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maintains a history of past queries and answers. For each new query, one first uses this
history to derive an answer for the query, and then uses SVT to check whether the error
of this derived answer is below a threshold. If it is, then one can use this derived answer
for this new query without consuming any privacy budget. Only when the error of this
derived answer is above the threshold, would one need to spend privacy budget accessing
the database to answer the query.
With the power of SVT come the subtlety of why it is private and the difficulty of ap-
plying it correctly. The version of SVT used in [17,68], which was abstracted into a generic
technique and described in Roth’s 2011 lecture notes [73], turned out to be not differentially
private as claimed. This error in [17,68] is arguably not critical because it is possible to use
a fixed version of SVT without affecting the main asymptotic results. Since 2014, several
variants of SVT were developed; they were used for frequent itemset mining [69], for fea-
ture selection in private classification [70], and for publishing high-dimensional data [71].
These usages are in the non-interactive setting, where all the queries are known ahead of
the time, and the goal is to find c queries that have large answers, e.g., finding the c most
frequent itemsets. Unfortunately, these variants do not satisfy DP, as pointed out in [74].
When using a correct version of SVT in these papers, one would get significantly worse
accuracy. Since these papers seek to improve the tradeoff between privacy and utility, the
results in them are thus invalid.
The fact that many usages of SVT are not private, even when proofs of their privacy
were given, is already known [74, 75]; however, we feel that what led to the erroneous
proofs were not clearly explained, and such an explanation can help researchers to avoid
similar errors in the future. One evidence of the continuing confusion over SVT appears
in [74], the first paper that identifies errors in some SVT variants. In [74], the SVT vari-
ants in [69–71] were modeled as a generalized private threshold testing algorithm (GPTT),
and a proof showing that GPTT does not satisfy ǫ-DP for any finite ǫ (which we use ∞-
DP to denote in this chapter) was given. However, as we show in this chapter, the proof
in [74] was incorrect. This error was not reported in the literature. One goal of this chapter
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is to clearly explain why correct usages of SVT is private, and what are the most likely
confusions that caused the myriad of incorrect usages of SVT.
A second goal of this chapter is to improve the accuracy of SVT. A version of SVT
with a correct privacy proof appeared in Dwork and Roth’s 2014 book [76], and was used
in some recent work, e.g., [72]. In this chapter, we present a version of SVT that adds
less noise for the same level of privacy. In addition, we develop a novel technique that
optimizes the privacy budget allocation between that for perturbing the threshold and that
for perturbing the query answers, and experimentally demonstrate its effectiveness.
A third goal of this chapter is to point out that usage of SVT can be replaced by the
Exponential Mechanism (EM) [14] when used in the non-interactive setting. Most recent
usages of SVT in [69–72] are in the non-interactive setting, where the goal is to select up
to c queries with the highest answers. In this setting, one could also use the Exponential
Mechanism (EM) [14] c times to achieve the same objective, each time selecting the query
with the highest answer. Using analysis as well as experiments, we demonstrate that EM
outperforms SVT.
In summary, this chapter has the following novel contributions.
1. We propose a new version of SVT that provides better utility. We also introduce an
effective technique to improve the performance of SVT. These enhancements achieve
better utility than previous SVT algorithms and can be applied to improve utility in
the interactive setting.
2. While previous papers have pointed out most of the errors in usages of SVT, we use
a detailed privacy proof of SVT to identify the misunderstandings that likely caused
the different non-private versions. We also point out a previously unknown error in
the proof in [74] of the non-privacy of some SVT variants.
3. Through analysis and experiments on real datasets, we have evaluated the effects
of various SVT optimizations and compared them to EM. Our results show that for
non-interactive settings, one should use EM instead of SVT.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We analyze six variants of SVT in Sec-
tion 5.2. In Section 5.3, we present our optimizations of SVT. We compare SVT with the
exponential mechanism in Section 5.4. The experimental results are shown in Section 5.5.
Related works are summarized in Section 5.6.
5.2 Variants of SVT
Figure 5.1.: An instantiation of the SVT proposed in this chapter
Input: A private database D, a stream of queries Q = q1, q2, · · · each with sensitivity no
more than ∆, either a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · or a single threshold T (see
footnote ∗), and c, the maximum number of queries to be answered with ⊤.
Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · · , where each ai ∈ {⊤,⊥} ∪ R and R denotes the
set of all real numbers.
Algorithm 17 An instantiation of the SVT proposed in this chapter.
1: Input: D,Q,∆,T = T1, T2, · · · , c.
2: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1)
3: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1, count = 0
4: for each query qi ∈ Q do
5: νi = Lap (2c∆/ǫ2)
6: if qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + ρ then
7: Output ai = ⊤
8: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
9: else




Figure 5.2.: SVT in Dwork and Roth 2014 [76]
Input: A private database D, a stream of queries Q = q1, q2, · · · each with sensitivity no
more than ∆, either a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · or a single threshold T (see
footnote ∗), and c, the maximum number of queries to be answered with ⊤.
Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · · , where each ai ∈ {⊤,⊥} ∪ R and R denotes the
set of all real numbers.
Algorithm 18 SVT in Dwork and Roth 2014 [76].
1: Input: D,Q,∆, T, c.
2: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (c∆/ǫ1)
3: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1, count = 0
4: for each query qi ∈ Q do
5: νi = Lap (2c∆/ǫ1)
6: if qi(D) + νi ≥ T + ρ then
7: Output ai = ⊤, ρ = Lap (c∆/ǫ2)
8: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
9: else




Figure 5.3.: SVT in Roth’s 2011 Lecture Notes [73]
Input: A private database D, a stream of queries Q = q1, q2, · · · each with sensitivity no
more than ∆, either a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · or a single threshold T (see
footnote ∗), and c, the maximum number of queries to be answered with ⊤.
Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · · , where each ai ∈ {⊤,⊥} ∪ R and R denotes the
set of all real numbers.
Algorithm 19 SVT in Roth’s 2011 Lecture Notes [73].
1: Input: D,Q,∆, T, c.
2: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1),
3: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1, count = 0
4: for each query qi ∈ Q do
5: νi = Lap (c∆/ǫ2)
6: if qi(D) + νi ≥ T + ρ then
7: Output ai = qi(D) + νi
8: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
9: else




Figure 5.4.: SVT in Lee and Clifton 2014 [69]
Input: A private database D, a stream of queries Q = q1, q2, · · · each with sensitivity no
more than ∆, either a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · or a single threshold T (see
footnote ∗), and c, the maximum number of queries to be answered with ⊤.
Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · · , where each ai ∈ {⊤,⊥} ∪ R and R denotes the
set of all real numbers.
Algorithm 20 SVT in Lee and Clifton 2014 [69].
1: Input: D,Q,∆, T, c.
2: ǫ1 = ǫ/4, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1)
3: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1, count = 0
4: for each query qi ∈ Q do
5: νi = Lap (∆/ǫ2)
6: if qi(D) + νi ≥ T + ρ then
7: Output ai = ⊤
8: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
9: else




Figure 5.5.: SVT in Stoddard et al. 2014 [70]
Input: A private database D, a stream of queries Q = q1, q2, · · · each with sensitivity no
more than ∆, either a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · or a single threshold T (see
footnote ∗), and c, the maximum number of queries to be answered with ⊤.
Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · · , where each ai ∈ {⊤,⊥} ∪ R and R denotes the
set of all real numbers.
Algorithm 21 SVT in Stoddard et al. 2014 [70].
1: Input: D,Q,∆, T .
2: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1)
3: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1
4: for each query qi ∈ Q do
5: νi = 0
6: if qi(D) + νi ≥ T + ρ then
7: Output ai = ⊤
8:
9: else




Figure 5.6.: SVT in Chen et al. 2015 [71]
Input: A private database D, a stream of queries Q = q1, q2, · · · each with sensitivity no
more than ∆, either a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · or a single threshold T (see
footnote ∗), and c, the maximum number of queries to be answered with ⊤.
Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · · , where each ai ∈ {⊤,⊥} ∪ R and R denotes the
set of all real numbers.
Algorithm 22 SVT in Chen et al. 2015 [71].
1: Input: D,Q,∆,T = T1, T2, · · · .
2: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1)
3: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1
4: for each query qi ∈ Q do
5: νi = Lap (∆/ǫ2)
6: if qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + ρ then
7: Output ai = ⊤
8:
9: else






Alg. 17 Alg. 18 Alg. 19 Alg. 20 Alg. 21 Alg. 22
ǫ1 ǫ/2 ǫ/2 ǫ/2 ǫ/4 ǫ/2 ǫ/2
Scale of threshold noise ρ ∆/ǫ1 c∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ1
Reset ρ after each output of ⊤ (unnecessary) Yes
Scale of query noise νi 2c∆/ǫ2 2c∆/ǫ2 c∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ2 0 ∆/ǫ2
Outputting qi + νi instead of ⊤ (not private) Yes
Outputting unbounded ⊤’s (not private) Yes Yes





Figure 5.7.: Differences among Algorithms 17-22.
∗ Algorithms 17 and 22 use a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · , allowing different thresholds for different queries. The
other algorithms use the same threshold T for all queries. We point out that this difference is mostly syntactical. In fact, having
an SVT where the threshold always equals 0 suffices. Given a sequence of queries q1, q2, · · · , and a sequence of thresholds
T = T1, T2, · · · , we can define a new sequence of queries ri = qi − Ti, and apply the SVT to ri using 0 as the threshold to
obtain the same result. In this chapter, we decide to use thresholds to be consistent with the existing papers.
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In this section, we analyze variants of SVT; six of them are listed in Figure 5.1 to
Figure 5.6. Alg. 17 is an instantiation of our proposed SVT. Alg. 18 is the version taken
from [76]. Alg. 19, 20, 21, and 22 are taken from [69–71, 73] respectively.
The table in Figure 5.7 summarizes the differences among these algorithms. Their
privacy properties are given in the last row of the table. Alg. 17 and 18 satisfy ǫ-DP, and
the rest of them do not. Alg. 19, 21, 22 do not satisfy ǫ-DP for any finite ǫ, which we denote
as∞-DP.
An important input parameter to any SVT algorithm is the number c, i.e., how many
positive outcomes one can answer before stopping. This number can be quite large. For
example, in privately finding top-c frequent itemsets [69], c ranges from 50 to 400. In using
selective stochastic gradient descent to train deep learning model privately [72], the number
of gradients to upload at each epoch ranges from 15 to 140,106.
To understand the differences between these variants, one can view SVT as having the
following four steps steps:
1. Generate the threshold noise ρ (Line 1 in each algorithm), which will be added to
the threshold during comparison between each query and the threshold (line 5). In
all except Alg. 18, ρ scales with ∆/ǫ1. In Alg. 18, however, ρ scales with c∆/ǫ1.
This extra factor of c in the noise scale causes Alg. 18 to be much less accurate than
Alg. 17. We show that including the factor of c is an effect of Alg. 18’s design to
resample ρ each time a query results in a positive outcome (Line 6). When keeping
ρ unchanged, ρ does not need to scale with c to achieve privacy.
2. For each query qi, generate noise νi to be added to the query (Line 4), which should
scale with 2c∆/ǫ2. In Alg. 20 and 22, νi scales with ∆/ǫ2. Removing the factor
of c from the magnitude of the noise will result in better utility; however, this is
done at the cost of being non-private. Alg. 21 adds no noise to qi at all, and is also
non-private.
3. Compare the perturbed query answer with the noisy threshold and output whether
it is above or below the threshold (Lines 5, 6, 9). Here Alg. 17 differs in that it
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outputs the noisy query answer qi(D) + νi, instead of an indicator ⊤. This makes it
non-private.
4. Keep track of the number of ⊤’s in the output, and stop when one has outputted c
⊤’s (Line 7). This step is missed in Alg. 21 and 22. Without this limitation, one can
answer as many queries as there are with a fixed accuracy level for each query. If this
was to be private, then one obtains privacy kind of “for free”.
5.2.1 Privacy Proof for Proposed SVT
We now prove the privacy of Alg. 17. We break down the proof into two steps, to
make the proof easier to understand, and, more importantly, to enable us to point out what
confusions likely cause the different non-private variants of SVT to be proposed. In the
first step, we analyze the situation where the output is ⊥ℓ, a length-ℓ vector 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉,
indicating that all ℓ queries are tested to be below the threshold.
Lemma 4 Let A be Alg. 17. For any neighboring datasets D and D′, and any integer ℓ,
we have
Pr
[A(D) = ⊥ℓ] ≤ eǫ1Pr [A(D′) = ⊥ℓ] .
Proof We have
Pr
[A(D) = ⊥ℓ] = ∫ ∞
−∞
Pr [ρ = z] fD(z) dz,
where fD(z) = Pr




Pr [qi(D) + νi < Ti + z] . (5.2)
The probability of outputting ⊥ℓ over D is the summation (or integral) of the product
of Pr [ρ = z], the probability that the threshold noise equals z, and fD(z), the conditional
probability that ⊥ℓ is the output on D given that the threshold noise ρ is z. The step from
(5.1) to (5.2) is because, givenD, T, the queries, and ρ, whether one query results in ⊥ or
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not depends completely on the noise νi and is independent from whether any other query
results in ⊥.
The key observation underlying the SVT technique is that for any neighboring D,D′,
we have fD(z) ≤ fD′(z +∆). Suppose that we have qi(D) = qi(D′)−∆ for each qi, then
the ratio fD(z)/fD′(z) is unbounded when |L| is unbounded. However, fD(z) is upper-
bounded by the case where the dataset is D′ but the noisy threshold is increased by ∆,
because for any query qi, |qi(D)− qi(D′)| ≤ ∆. More precisely, we have
Pr [qi(D) + νi < Ti + z] = Pr [νi < Ti − qi(D) + z]
≤ Pr [νi < Ti +∆− qi(D′) + z]
= Pr [qi(D
′) + νi < Ti + (z +∆)] . (5.3)
Because ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1), by the property of the Laplace distribution, we have:
∀z, Pr [ρ = z] ≤ eǫ1 Pr [ρ = z +∆] , and thus
Pr
[A(D) = ⊥ℓ] = ∫ ∞
−∞








Pr [ρ = z′] fD′(z′) dz′ let z′ = z +∆
= eǫ1Pr
[A(D′) = ⊥ℓ] .
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We can obtain a similar result when the output is ⊤ℓ instead of ⊥ℓ, i.e.,
Pr
[A(D) = ⊤ℓ] ≤ eǫ1Pr [A(D′) = ⊤ℓ], because Pr [ρ = z] ≤ eǫ1 Pr [ρ = z −∆] and




Pr [qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + z] . (5.4)
The fact that this bounding technique works both for positive outputs and negative
outputs likely contributes to the misunderstandings behind Alg. 21 and 22, which treat
positive and negative outputs exactly the same way. The error is that when the output
consists of both ⊥ and ⊤, one has to choose one side (either positive or negative) to be
bounded by the above technique, and cannot do both at the same time.
We also observe that the proof of Lemma 4 will go through if no noise is added to the
query answers, i.e., νi = 0, because Eq (5.3) holds even when νi = 0. It is likely because of
this observation that Alg. 21 adds no noise to query answers. However, when considering
outcomes that include both positive answers (⊤’s) and negative answers (⊥’s), one has to
add noises to the query answers, as we show below.
Theorem 5.2.1 Alg. 17 is ǫ-DP.
Proof Consider any output vector a ∈ {⊥,⊤}ℓ. Let a = 〈a1, · · · , aℓ〉, I⊤ = {i : ai =
⊤}, and I⊥ = {i : ai = ⊥}. Clearly, |I⊤| ≤ c. We have
Pr [A(D) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞










The following, together with ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2, prove this theorem:
Pr [ρ=z] ≤ eǫ1Pr [ρ=z +∆]
fD(z) ≤ fD′(z +∆) (5.6)
gD(z) ≤ eǫ2gD′(z +∆). (5.7)
Eq. (5.6) deals with all the negative outcomes. Eq. (5.7), which deals with posi-
tive outcomes, is ensured by several factors. At most c positive outcomes can occur,
|qi(D) − qi(D′)| ≤ ∆, and the threshold for D′ is just ∆ higher that for D; thus adding

















′) + νi ≥ Ti + z +∆] (5.10)
= eǫ2gD′(z +∆).
Eq. (5.8) is because−qi(D) ≥−∆−qi(D′), Eq. (5.9) is from the Laplace distribution’s
property, and Eq. (5.10) is because there are at most c positive outcomes, i.e., |I⊤| ≤ c.
We observe that while gD(z) ≤ gD′(z−∆) is true, replacing (5.7) with it does not help
us prove anything, because (5.6) uses (z+∆) and (5.7) uses (z−∆), and we cannot change
the integration variable in a consistent way.
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5.2.2 Privacy Properties of Other Variants
Alg. 18 is taken from the differential privacy book published in 2014 [76]. It satisfies ǫ-DP.
It has two differences when compared with Alg. 17. First, ρ follows Lap (c∆/ǫ1) instead of
Lap (∆/ǫ1). This causes Alg. 18 to have significantly worse performance than Alg. 17, as
we show in Section 5.5. Second, Alg. 18 refreshes the noisy threshold T after each output
of ⊤. We note that making the threshold noise scale with c is necessary for privacy only
if one refreshes the threshold noise after each output of ⊤; however, such refreshing is
unnecessary.
Alg. 19 is taken from [73], which in turn was abstracted from the algorithms used
in [17, 68]. It has two differences from Alg. 17. First, νi follows Lap (c∆/ǫ2) instead




it actually outputs the noisy query answer instead of ⊤ for a query above the threshold.
This latter fact causes Alg. 19 to be not ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′. A proof for this appeared
in Appendix A of [75]; The error in the proof for Alg. 19’s privacy in [73] occurs in the
following steps:






















′) + νi = ai]
The error occurs when going to (5.11), which is implicitly done in [73]. This step
removes the condition qi(D)+νi ≥ T+z.
Another way to look at this error is that outputting the positive query answers reveals
information about the noisy threshold, since the noisy threshold must be below the out-
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putted query answer. Once information about the noisy threshold is leaked, the ability to
answer each negative query “for free” disappears.
Alg. 20, taken from [69], differs from Alg. 17 in the following ways. First, it sets ǫ1 to be
ǫ/4 instead of ǫ/2. This has no impact on the privacy. Second, νi does not scale with c.





ǫ-DP in general. In [69], Alg. 20 is applied for finding
frequent itemsets, where the queries are counting queries and are monotonic. Because of





ǫ-DP. Theorem 5.3.1 can be applied
to Alg. 20 to establish this privacy property; we thus omit the proof of this.
Alg. 22, taken from [71], was motivated by the observation that the proof in [69] can go
through without stopping after encountering c positive outcomes, and removed this limita-
tion.
Alg 21, taken from [70], further used the observation that the derivation of Lemma 4 does
not depend on the addition of noises, and removed that part as well. The proofs for Alg. 20,
21, 22 in [69–71] roughly use the logic below.
∫ ∞
−∞







Pr [ρ=z] fD(z) dz ≤ eǫ/2
∫ ∞
−∞


















A proof that Alg. 22 does not satisfy ǫ-DP for any finite ǫ is given in Appendix B of [75].
While these proofs also apply to Alg. 21, we give a much simpler proof of this below.
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Theorem 5.2.2 Alg. 21 is not ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′.
Proof Consider a simple example, with T = 0, ∆ = 1, q = 〈q1, q2〉 such that q(D) =
〈0, 1〉 and q(D′) = 〈1, 0〉, and a = 〈⊥,⊤〉. Then by Eq (5.5), we have
Pr [A(D) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞




Pr [ρ = z] dz > 0,
which is nonzero; and
Pr [A(D′) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr [ρ = z′]Pr [1 < z′]Pr [0 ≥ z′] dz′,
which is zero. So the probability ratio
Pr[A(D)=a]
Pr[A(D′)=a] =∞.
5.2.3 Error in Privacy Analysis of GPTT
In [74], the SVT variants in [69–71] were modeled as a generalized private threshold
testing algorithm (GPTT). In GPTT, the threshold T is perturbed using ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1) and
each query answer is perturbed using Lap (∆/ǫ2) and there is no cutoff; thus GPTT can be





There is a constructive proof in [74] to show that GPTT is not ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′.
However, this proof is incorrect. This error is quite subtle. We discovered the error only
after observing that the technique of the proof can be applied to show that Alg. 17 (which
we have proved to be private) to be non-private.
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Pr [GPTT(D) = a]
Pr [GPTT(D′) = a]
=
∫∞
−∞ Pr [ρ = z] (Fǫ2(z)−Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z−1))t dz∫∞
−∞ Pr [ρ = z] (Fǫ2(z−1)−Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z−1))t dz
where Fǫ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of Lap (1/ǫ) .
The goal of the proof is to show that the above is unbounded as t increases. A key
observation is that the ratio of the integrands of the two integrals is always larger than 1,
i.e.,
κ(z) =
Fǫ2(z)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1)
Fǫ2(z − 1)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1)
> 1
For example when z = 0, Fǫ2(0) = 1/2, and κ(0) =
1−Fǫ2 (−1)
Fǫ2(−1)
. However, when |z| goes to
∞, κ(z) goes to 1.
The proof tries to limit the integrals to be a finite interval. It denotes α =




Pr [ρ = z] (Fǫ2(z − 1)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))t dz.






. They claimed that for any ǫ′ > 1 there exists a t to make the above
ratio larger than eǫ
′
.
The proof is incorrect because of dependency in the parameters. First, α is a function of
t; and when t increases, α decreases because the integrand above is positive and decreasing.
Second, δ depends on α, and when α decreases, δ increases. Thus when t increases, δ
increases. We write δ as δ(t) to make the dependency on t explicit. Third, κ, the minimum
value of κ(z) over the interval [−δ(t), δ(t)], decreases when t increases. That is, κ is also
dependent on t, denoted by κ(t), and decreases while t increases. It is not sure that there





for any ǫ′ > 1.
To demonstrate that the error in the proof is fundamental, we point out that following
the logic of that proof, one can prove that Alg. 17 is not ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′. We now
show such a “proof” that contradicts Lemma 4. Let A be Alg. 17, with c = 1. Consider
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an example with ∆ = 1, T = 0, a sequence q of t queries such that q(D) = 0t and





































Find a parameter δ such that
∫ δ
−δ Pr [ρ = z] dz ≥ 1 − α2 . Then∫ δ




(z − 1))t dz ≥ α
2
































(z − 1))t dz ≥ κt
2
α.





to be as large as needed.
We note that this contradicts Lemma 4. The contradiction shows that the proof logic used
in [74] is incorrect.
5.2.4 Other Variants
Some usages of SVT aim at satisfying (ǫ, δ)-DP [5], instead of ǫ-DP. These often exploit
the advanced composition theorem for DP [77], which states that applying k instances of
ǫ-DP algorithms satisfies (ǫ′, δ′)-DP, where ǫ′ =
√
2k ln(1/δ′)ǫ+kǫ(eǫ−1). In this chapter,
we limit our attention to SVT variants to those satisfying ǫ-DP, which are what have been
used in the data mining community [69–72].
The SVT used in [17, 19] has another difference from Alg. 19. In [17, 19], the goal
of using SVT is to determine whether the error of using an answer derived from past
queries/answers is below a threshold. This check takes the form of “if |q˜i − qi(D) + νi| ≥
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T + ρ then output i,” where q˜i gives the estimated answer of a query obtained using past
queries/answers, and qi(D) gives the true answer. This is incorrect because the noise νi
should be outside the absolute value sign. In the usage in [17,19], the left hand of the com-
parison is always ≥ 0; thus whenever the output includes at least one ⊤, one immediately
knows that the threshold noise ρ≥−T . This leakage of ρ is somewhat similar to Alg. 19’s
leakage caused by outputting noisy query answers that are found to be above the noisy
threshold. This problem can be fixed by using “if |q˜i−qi(D)|+νi ≥ T +ρ then output i”
instead. By viewing ri = |q˜i− qi(D)| as the query to be answered; this becomes a standard
application of SVT.
5.3 Optimizing SVT
Alg. 17 can be viewed as allocating half of the privacy budget for perturbing the thresh-
old and half for perturbing the query answers. This allocation is somewhat arbitrary, and
other allocations are possible. Indeed, Alg. 20 uses a ratio of 1 : 3 instead of 1 : 1. In this
section, we study how to improve SVT by optimizing this allocation ratio and by introduc-
ing other techniques.
5.3.1 A Generalized SVT Algorithm
We present a generalized SVT algorithm in Alg. 23, which uses ǫ1 to perturb the thresh-
old and ǫ2 to perturb the query answers. Furthermore, to accommodate the situations where
one wants the noisy counts for positive queries, we also use ǫ3 to output query answers us-
ing the Laplace mechanism.
We now prove the privacy for Alg. 23; the proof requires only minor changes from the
proof of Theorem 5.2.1.
Theorem 5.3.1 Alg. 23 is (ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ3)-DP.
Proof Alg. 23 can be divided into two phases, the first phase outputs a vector to mark
which query is above the threshold and the second phase uses the Laplace mechanism to
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Algorithm 23 Our Proposed Standard SVT
1: Input: D,Q,∆,T = T1, T2, · · · , c and ǫ1, ǫ2 and ǫ3.
2: Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · ·





, count = 0
4: for Each query qi ∈ Q do





6: if qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + ρ then
7: if ǫ3 > 0 then






10: Output ai = ⊤
11: end if
12: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
13: else




output noisy counts for the queries that are found to be above the threshold in the first phase.
Since the second phase is ǫ3-DP, it suffices to show that the first phase is (ǫ1 + ǫ2)-DP. For
any output vector a ∈ {⊤,⊥}ℓ, we want to show
Pr [A(D) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞




eǫ1+ǫ2Pr [ρ=z +∆] fD′(z +∆) gD′(z +∆) dz
= eǫ1+ǫ2Pr [A(D′) = a] .
This holds because, similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.2.1,








Pr [qi(D)+νi≥Ti+z] ≤ eǫ2gD′(z +∆).
5.3.2 Optimizing Privacy Budget Allocation
In Alg. 23, one needs to decide how to divide up a total privacy budget ǫ into ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3.
We note that ǫ1+ ǫ2 is used for outputting the indicator vector, and ǫ3 is used for outputting
the noisy counts for queries found to be above the threshold; thus the ratio of (ǫ1 + ǫ2) : ǫ3
is determined by the domain needs and should be an input to the algorithm.
On the other hand, the ratio of ǫ1 : ǫ2 affects the accuracy of SVT. Most variants use
1 : 1, without a clear justification. To choose a ratio that can be justified, we observe that




































when ǫ1 + ǫ2 is fixed. This is minimized when
ǫ1 : ǫ2 = 1 : (2c)
2/3. (5.12)
We will evaluate the improvement resulted from this optimization in Section 5.5.
5.3.3 SVT for Monotonic Queries
In some usages of SVT, the queries are monotonic. That is, when changing from D
to D′, all queries whose answers are different change in the same direction, i.e., there do
not exist qi, qj such that (qi(D) > qi(D
′)) ∧ (qj(D) < qj(D′)). That is, we have either
∀i qi(D) ≥ qi(D′), or ∀i qi(D′) ≥ qi(D). This is the case when using SVT for frequent
itemset mining in [69] with neighboring datasets defined as adding or removing one tuple.

















in line 3 satisfies (ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ3)-DP when all
queries are monotonic.
Proof Because the second phase of Alg. 23 is still ǫ3-DP, we just need to show that for
any output vector a,
Pr [A(D) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr [ρ=z] fD(z) gD(z) dz









It suffices to show that either Pr [ρ=z] fD(z)gD(z) ≤ eǫ1+ǫ2Pr [ρ=z] fD′(z)gD′(z), or
Pr [ρ=z] fD(z)gD(z) ≤ eǫ1+ǫ2Pr [ρ=z +∆] fD′(z +∆)gD′(z +∆).
First consider the case that qi(D) ≥ qi(D′) for any query qi. In this case, we have
Pr [qi(D) + νi < Ti + z] ≤ Pr
[
qi(D
′) + νi < Ti + z
]
,
and thus fD(z) ≤ fD′(z). Note that qi(D)− qi(D′) ≤ ∆. Therefore, gD(z) ≤ eǫ2gD′(z),
without increasing the noisy threshold by ∆, because Pr [qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + z] ≤
Pr [qi(D
′) + νi ≥ Ti + z −∆] ≤ e
ǫ2
c Pr [qi(D






Then consider the case in which qi(D) ≤ qi(D′) for any query qi. We have the usual
fD(z) ≤ fD′(z +∆),
and Pr [ρ=z] ≤ eǫ1Pr [ρ=z +∆] ,






to ensure that Pr [qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + z] ≤ e
ǫ2
c Pr [qi(D
′) + νi ≥ Ti +∆+ z]. Thus gD(z) ≤
eǫ2gD′(z +∆) holds.
For monotonic queries, the optimization of privacy budget allocation (5.12) becomes
ǫ1 : ǫ2 = 1 : c
2/3.
143
5.4 SVT versus EM
We now discuss the application of SVT in the non-interactive setting, where all the
queries are known ahead of the time. We note that most recent usages of SVT, e.g., [38,
69–72], are in the non-interactive setting. Furthermore, these applications of SVT aim at
selecting up to c queries with the highest answers. In [69], SVT is applied to find the c
most frequent itemsets, where the queries are the supports for the itemsets. In [71], the
goal of using SVT is to determine the structure of a Bayesian Network that preserves as
much information of the dataset as possible. To this end, they select attribute groups that
are highly correlated and create edges for such groups in the network. While the algorithm
in [71] takes the form of selecting attribute groups with score above a certain threshold,
the real goal is to select the groups with the highest scores. In [72], SVT is used to select
parameters to be shared when trying to learn neural-network models in a private fashion.
Once selected, noises are added to these parameters before they are shared. The selection
step aims at selecting the parameters with the highest scores.
EM or SVT. In non-interactive setting, one can also use the Exponential Mechanism
(EM) [14] to achieve the same objective of selecting the top c queries. More specifically,
one runs EM c times, each round with privacy budget ǫ
c
. The quality for each query is its











in the monotonic case. After one query is selected, it is removed from
the pool of candidate queries for the remaining rounds.
An intriguing question is which of SVT and EM offers higher accuracy. Theorem 3.24
in [76] regarding the utility of SVT with c = ∆ = 1 states: For any sequence of k queries
f1, . . . , fk such that |{i < k : fi(D) ≥ T−α}| = 0 (i.e. the only query close to being above
threshold is possibly the last one), SVT is (α, β) accurate (meaning that with probability at
least 1 − β, all queries with answer below T − α result in ⊥ and all queries with answers
above T − α result in ⊤) for: αSVT = 8(log k + log(2/β))/ǫ.
In the case where the last query is at least T +α, being (α, β)-correct ensures that with
probability at least 1 − β, the correct selection is made. For the same setting, we say that
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EM is (α, β)-correct if given k−1 queries with answer≤ T−α and one query with answer
≥ T + α, the correct selection is made with probability at least 1 − β. The probability of
selecting the query with answer ≥ T + α is at least eǫ(T+α)/2
(k−1)eǫ(T−α)/2+eǫ(T+α)/2 by the definition
of EM. To ensure this probability is at least 1− β,
αEM = (log(k − 1) + log((1− β)/β))/ǫ,
which is less than 1/8 of the αSVT, which suggests that EM is more accurate than SVT.
The above analysis relies on assuming that the first k − 1 queries are no more than
T − α. When that is not assumed, it is difficult analyze the utility of either SVT or EM.
Therefore, we will use experimental methods to compare SVT with EM.
SVT with Retraversal. We want to find the most optimized version of SVT to compare
with EM, and note that another interesting parameter that one can tune when applying SVT
is that of the threshold T . When T is high, the algorithm may select fewer than c queries
after traversing all queries. Since roughly each selected query consumes 1
c
’th of the privacy
budget, outputting few than c queries kind of “wasted” the remaining privacy budget. When
T is low, however, the algorithm may have selected c queries before encountering later
queries. Nomatter how large some of these later query answers are, they cannot be selected.
We observe that in the non-interactive setting, there is a way to deal with this chal-
lenge. One can use a higher threshold T , and when the algorithm runs out of queries before
finding c above-threshold queries, one can retraverse the list of queries that have not been
selected so far, until c queries are selected. However, it is unclear how to select the optimal
threshold. In our experiments, we consider SVT-ReTr, which increases the threshold T
by different multiples of the scale factor of the Laplace noise injected to each query, and
applies the retraversal technique.
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5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally compare the different versions of the SVT algorithm,
including our proposed SVT algorithm with different privacy budget allocation methods.
We also compare the SVT variants applicable in the non-interactive setting with EM.
Utility Measures. Since the goal of applying SVT or EM is to select the top queries,
one standard metric is False negative rate (FNR), i.e., the fraction of true top-c queries that
are missed. When an algorithm outputs exactly c results, the FNR is the same as the False
Positive Rate, the fraction of incorrectly selected queries.
The FNRmetric has some limitations. First, missing the highest query will be penalized
the same as missing the c-th one. Second, selecting a query with a very low score will be
penalized the same as selecting the (c + 1)-th query, whose score may be quite close to
the c’th query. We thus use another metric that we call Score Error Rate (SER), which
measures the ratio of “missed scores” by selecting S instead of the true top c queries,
denoted by Topc.
SER = 1.0− avgScore(S)
avgScore(Topc)
.
We present results for both FNR and SER and observe that the correlation between
them is quite stable.
Table 5.1.: Dataset characteristics





Datasets. The performance of different algorithms would be affected by the distribution
of query scores, we thus want to evaluate the algorithms on several representative distribu-
tions. In the experiments, we use the item frequencies in three real datasets: BMS-POS,
Kosarak and AOL as representative distributions of query scores. In addition, we also use
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Table 5.2.: Summary of algorithms
Settings Methods Description
Interactive
SVT-DPBook DPBook SVT (Alg. 18).
SVT-S Standard SVT (Alg. 23).
Non-interactive





















Figure 5.8.: The distribution of 300 highest scores from experiment datasets.
the distribution inspired by the Zipf’s law, which states that given some corpus of natu-
ral language utterances, the frequency of any word is inversely proportional to its rank in
the frequency table. Similar phenomenon occurs in many other rankings unrelated to lan-
guage, such as the population ranks of cities in various countries, corporation sizes, income
rankings, ranks of number of people watching the same TV channel, and so on. In this dis-
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tribution, the i’th query has a score proportional to 1
i
. The characteristics of these datasets
are summarized in Table 5.1, and the distribution of the 300 highest scores are shown in
Figure 5.8.
Evaluation Setup. We consider the following algorithms. SVT-DPBook is from Dwork
and Roth’s 2014 book [76] (Algorithm 18). SVT-S is our proposed standard SVT, i.e.,
Algorithm 23 without numerical outputs (ǫ3 = 0); and since the count query is monotonic,
we use the version for monotonic queries in Section 5.3.3. We consider four privacy budget
allocations, 1:1, 1:3, 1:c and 1:c2/3, where the last is what our analysis suggests for the
monotonic case. These algorithms can be applied in both the interactive and the non-
interactive setting.
For the non-interactive setting, we consider EM and SVT-ReTr, which is SVT with the
optimizations of increasing the threshold and retraversing through the queries (items) until
c of them are selected. We fix the privacy budget allocation to be 1 : c2/3 and vary the
amount we increase the threshold from 1D, 2D, . . ., to 5D, where 1D means adding one
standard deviation of the added noises to the threshold.
We vary c from 25 to 300, and each time uses the average score for the c’th query and
the c + 1’th query as the threshold. We show results for privacy budget ǫ = 0.1 in the
paper. We omit results for other ǫ values because of space limitation. We note that varying
c have a similar impact of varying ǫ, since the accuracy of each method is mostly affect
by ǫ
c
; therefore the impact of different ǫ can be seen from different c values. We run each
experiment 100 times, each time randomizing the order of items to be examined. We report
the average and standard deviation of SER. All algorithms are implemented in Python 2.7
and all the experiments are conducted on an Intel Core i7-3770 3.40GHz PC with 16GB
memory.
Results in the Interactive Setting. Figure 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 reports the results for
the algorithms that can be applied in the interactive setting. While it is clear that in some
settings (such as when c = 25) all methods are quite accurate, and in some other settings
all methods are very inaccurate (such as when c ≥ 100 for the Zipf dataset), in the settings
in between the two extremes, the differences between these methods are quite large.
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SVT-DPBook performs the worst, followed by SVT-S-1:1, then by SVT-S-1:3, and
finally by SVT-S-1:c and SVT-S-1:c23. The differences among these algorithms can be
quite pronounced. For example, on the Kosarak dataset, with ǫ = 0.1, c = 50, SVT-
DPBook’s SER is 0.705, which means that the average support of selected items is only
around 30% of that for the true top-50 items, which we interpret to mean that the output is
meaningless. In contrast, all four SVT-S algorithms have SER less than 0.05, suggesting
high accuracy in the selection. SVT-DPBook’s poor performance is due to the fact that the
threshold is perturbed by a noise with scale as large as c∆/ǫ.
For the differences among the four budget allocation approaches, it appears that the
performance of 1 : c and 1 : c
2
3 are clearly better than the others; and their advantages over
the standard 1 : 1 allocation is quite pronounced. Which of 1 : c and 1 : c
2
3 is better is less
clear. In general, the former is better for larger c values, where the error is higher, and the
latter is better for smaller c values, where the error is lower. Also note that 1 : c results
in a significantly larger standard deviation. For these reasons, we interpret the results as
supporting the recommendation of using 1:c2/3 budget allocation.
Results in the Non-interactive Setting. Figure 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and, 5.16 reports the
results for the algorithms that can be applied in the noninteractive setting. We observe that
EM clearly performs better than SVT-ReTr-1:c23, which performs essentially the same as
SVT-S-1:c23, which is the best algorithm for the interactive case, and is already much
better than SVT algorithms used in the literature. For example, for the AOL dataset with
c = 150, EM’s SER is 0.15, while SVT-S with 1 : c2/3 allocation has SER of 0.59, and
SVT-S with 1 : 1 allocation has SER of 0.99.
It is interesting to see that increasing the threshold can significantly improve the accu-
racy of SVT with Retraversal. However, the best threshold increment value depends on the
dataset and the number of items to be selected. For example, 5D works well for Zipf, and
for Kosarak and AOL when c is large, but works not as well for BMS and for Kosarak and
AOL when c is small. Since it is unclear how to select the best threshold increment value,
and even with the best threshold increment, SVT-ReTr performs no better than EM, our
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experiments suggest that usage of SVT should be replaced by EM in the non-interactive
setting.
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(c) Kosarak, SER (d) Kosarak, FNR
Figure 5.9.: Comparison of interactive approaches: SVT-DPBook and SVT-S with different
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Figure 5.10.: Comparison of interactive approaches: SVT-DPBook and SVT-S with differ-
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Figure 5.11.: Comparison of interactive approaches: SVT-DPBook and SVT-S with differ-
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Figure 5.12.: Comparison of interactive approaches: SVT-DPBook and SVT-S with differ-
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Figure 5.13.: Comparison of non-interactive approaches: EM and SVT-ReTr with different
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Figure 5.14.: Comparison of non-interactive approaches: EM and SVT-ReTr with different
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Figure 5.15.: Comparison of non-interactive approaches: EM and SVT-ReTr with different
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Figure 5.16.: Comparison of non-interactive approaches: EM and SVT-ReTr with different




Table 5.3.: Comparison of SVT-DPBook, SVT-S, SVT-ReTr and EM on selecting top-c queries in terms of SER when ǫ = 0.1
on datasets BMS-POS and Kosarak. For each row, the best SER value in the non-interactive setting is marked by italics and




Interactive Setting Non-interactive Setting
Budget SVT- SVT-S SVT-ReTr-1 : c2/3
EM
DPBook 1 : 1 1 : 3 1 : c 1 : c2/3 1D 2D 3D
BMS-
50 0.0720.051 0.0170.027 0.0160.025 0.0300.040 0.0170.029 0 .0010 .001 0.0040.007 0.0170.010 0 .0010 .001
100 0.5610.085 0.2550.078 0.0960.047 0.1010.097 0.0630.055 0.0100.019 0 .0070 .003 0.0180.011 0 .0070 .003
POS 150 0.6690.073 0.5050.079 0.3410.080 0.2890.221 0.2200.083 0.0490.012 0 .0470 .007 0.0560.013 0.0480.006
ǫ = 0.1
200 0.6820.071 0.6280.069 0.5620.070 0.5080.223 0.4780.101 0.1730.067 0 .0910 .007 0.0920.007 0.0920.008
300 0.6210.069 0.6310.065 0.6070.064 0.5350.225 0.5810.083 0.2240.092 0 .1340 .008 0.1380.007 0.1410.009
Kosarak
50 0.7050.142 0.0470.061 0.0320.062 0.0330.063 0.0250.049 0.0090.034 0.0010.001 0.0050.005 0 .0000 .000
100 0.9680.043 0.8960.080 0.6400.142 0.3730.247 0.3980.144 0.1030.098 0.0380.009 0.0400.008 0 .0330 .005
150 0.9720.037 0.9560.046 0.9040.075 0.7720.208 0.8180.108 0.6270.134 0.2760.141 0.1410.008 0 .1390 .007
ǫ = 0.1
200 0.9740.037 0.9670.044 0.9600.034 0.8650.177 0.9420.045 0.8330.107 0.6560.121 0.2650.083 0 .2190 .008




Table 5.4.: Comparison of SVT-DPBook, SVT-S, SVT-ReTr and EM on selecting top-c queries in terms of SER when ǫ = 0.1
on datasets AOL and Zipf. For each row, the best SER value in the non-interactive setting is marked by italics and the best
SER value in the interactive setting is marked by boldface. Each cell gives the average value of SER with standard deviation.
Dataset
c
Interactive Setting Non-interactive Setting
Budget SVT- SVT-S SVT-ReTr-1 : c2/3
EM
DPBook 1 : 1 1 : 3 1 : c 1 : c2/3 1D 2D 3D
AOL
50 0.2250.062 0.0160.016 0.0130.015 0.0230.023 0.0110.013 0.0020.005 0.0030.007 0.0120.011 0 .0010 .001
100 0.9930.008 0.7390.046 0.0720.029 0.0930.093 0.0250.017 0.0070.006 0.0070.010 0.0680.034 0 .0050 .002
150 0.9980.003 0.9860.009 0.9020.028 0.5320.215 0.5870.075 0.3460.082 0.1780.033 0.1730.014 0 .1530 .015
ǫ = 0.1
200 0.9990.002 0.9960.005 0.9870.009 0.9240.090 0.9550.019 0.8940.031 0.7870.050 0.5910.073 0 .4120 .014
300 0.9990.002 0.9980.003 0.9970.003 0.9860.033 0.9950.005 0.9900.006 0.9790.011 0.9550.020 0 .6830 .014
Zipf
50 0.9570.054 0.9170.076 0.8320.103 0.6650.269 0.7110.151 0.4230.171 0.1640.118 0.0900.016 0 .0820 .011
100 0.9690.029 0.9600.053 0.9550.041 0.9240.116 0.9440.057 0.8760.083 0.7500.123 0.4040.118 0 .2620 .015
150 0.9520.053 0.9520.050 0.9580.035 0.9220.094 0.9360.067 0.8960.072 0.7650.108 0.4680.112 0 .3550 .017
ǫ = 0.1
200 0.9470.049 0.9460.052 0.9480.038 0.8980.128 0.9400.047 0.8870.077 0.7690.105 0.4680.087 0 .4120 .016




Table 5.5.: Comparison of SVT-DPBook, SVT-S, SVT-ReTr and EM on selecting top-c queries in terms of SER when ǫ = 0.5
on datasets BMS-POS and Kosarak. For each row, the best SER value in the non-interactive setting is marked by italics and




Interactive Setting Non-interactive Setting
Budget SVT- SVT-S SVT-ReTr-1 : c2/3
EM
DPBook 1 : 1 1 : 3 1 : c 1 : c2/3 1D 2D 3D
BMS-
50 0.0090.011 0.0080.017 0.0060.016 0.0070.017 0.0040.006 0 .0000 .002 0.0020.003 0.0050.005 0 .0000 .000
100 0.0400.034 0.0110.012 0.0090.017 0.0130.021 0.0080.016 0 .0000 .001 0.0000.001 0.0030.003 0 .0000 .000
POS 150 0.1130.047 0.0120.014 0.0070.005 0.0170.019 0.0080.008 0 .0010 .001 0.0020.002 0.0140.006 0 .0010 .000
ǫ = 0.5
200 0.3690.067 0.1230.051 0.0400.023 0.0480.057 0.0240.031 0 .0030 .001 0 .0030 .001 0.0090.005 0 .0030 .001
300 0.5160.068 0.4290.068 0.3120.061 0.2840.224 0.2370.069 0.0340.028 0 .0210 .002 0.0220.003 0.0220.002
Kosarak
50 0.0200.044 0.0210.053 0.0020.005 0.0060.028 0.0010.003 0.0020.012 0 .0000 .001 0 .0000 .001 0 .0000 .000
100 0.1400.104 0.0360.056 0.0180.032 0.0390.082 0.0250.052 0.0020.018 0 .0000 .001 0.0040.003 0 .0000 .000
150 0.6400.126 0.0420.050 0.0080.013 0.0620.109 0.0150.036 0 .0010 .000 0.0030.003 0.0180.007 0 .0010 .000
ǫ = 0.5
200 0.8690.075 0.4300.112 0.0850.061 0.0770.102 0.0370.045 0 .0040 .003 0 .0040 .002 0.0180.007 0 .0040 .001




Table 5.6.: Comparison of SVT-DPBook, SVT-S, SVT-ReTr and EM on selecting top-c queries in terms of SER when ǫ = 0.5
on datasets AOL and Zipf. For each row, the best SER value in the non-interactive setting is marked by italics and the best SER
value in the interactive setting is marked by boldface. Each cell gives the average value of SER with standard deviation.
Dataset
c
Interactive Setting Non-interactive Setting
Budget SVT- SVT-S SVT-ReTr-1 : c2/3
EM
DPBook 1 : 1 1 : 3 1 : c 1 : c2/3 1D 2D 3D
AOL
50 0.0080.010 0.0050.009 0.0050.009 0.0060.011 0.0040.005 0.0010.004 0.0020.004 0.0040.006 0 .0000 .000
100 0.0170.015 0.0100.009 0.0070.007 0.0220.018 0.0090.009 0 .0000 .001 0.0030.005 0.0200.010 0 .0000 .000
150 0.1360.029 0.0130.010 0.0080.008 0.0200.021 0.0070.007 0 .0000 .000 0.0010.002 0.0140.009 0 .0000 .000
ǫ = 0.5
200 0.8000.032 0.0160.009 0.0080.005 0.0320.031 0.0080.007 0 .0010 .000 0.0030.004 0.0230.010 0 .0010 .000
300 0.9880.007 0.7480.031 0.0980.017 0.0740.070 0.0180.012 0 .0050 .002 0.0060.003 0.0360.012 0 .0050 .001
Zipf
50 0.4260.142 0.0340.059 0.0110.019 0.0220.042 0.0200.043 0.0040.032 0.0020.003 0.0090.007 0 .0000 .000
100 0.9190.061 0.8080.093 0.5710.111 0.3530.260 0.3610.138 0.0900.068 0.0350.006 0.0360.006 0 .0330 .005
150 0.9350.053 0.9160.052 0.8640.072 0.7450.224 0.7840.108 0.5700.143 0.2320.126 0.1140.007 0 .1110 .007
ǫ = 0.5
200 0.9320.054 0.9190.050 0.8960.065 0.8480.156 0.8630.077 0.7340.111 0.4350.134 0.1730.024 0 .1700 .009
300 0.9030.067 0.9120.052 0.8990.059 0.8320.178 0.9070.058 0.7670.098 0.4840.127 0 .2470 .018 0 .2470 .011
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5.6 Related Work
SVT was introduced by Dwork et al. [23], and improved by Roth and Roughgarden [19]
and by Hardt and Rothblum [17]. These usages are in an interactive setting. An early
description of SVT as a stand-alone technique appeared in Roth’s 2011 lecture notes [73],
which is Alg. 19 in this chapter, and is in fact ∞-DP. The algorithms in [17, 19] also has
another difference, as discussed in Section 5.2.4. Another version of SVT appeared in the
2014 book [76], which is Alg. 18. This version is used in some papers, e.g., [72]. We
show that it is possible to add less noise and obtain higher accuracy for the same privacy
parameter.
Lee and Clifton [69] used a variant of SVT (see Algorithm 20) to find itemsets whose
support is above the threshold. Stoddard et al. [70] proposed another variant (see Algorithm
21) for private feature selection for classification to pick out the set of features with scores
greater than the perturbed threshold. Chen et al. [71] employed yet another variant of
SVT (see Algorithm 22) to return attribute pairs with mutual information greater than the
corresponding noisy threshold. These usages are not private. Some of these errors were
pointed in [74], in which a generalized private threshold testing algorithm (GPTT) that
attempts to model the SVT variants in [69–71] was introduced. The authors showed that
GPTT did not satisfy ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′. But there is an error in the proof, as shown
in Section 5.2.3. Independent from our work, Zhang et al. [75] presented two proofs that
the variant of SVT violates DP without discussing the cause of the errors. Also presented
in [75] is a special case of our proposed Alg. 1 for counting queries. To our knowledge, the
general version of our improved SVT (Alg. 17 and Alg. 23), the techniques of optimizing
budget allocation, the technique of using re-traversal to improve SVT, and the comparison
of SVT and EM are new in our work.
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6. SUMMARY
In this dissertation, we considered the problem of differentially private data publishing for
data analysis.
First, we have introduced PrivPfC, a novel framework for publishing data for classifica-
tion under differential privacy. As a core part of PrivPfC, we have introduced a novel qual-
ity function that enables the selection of a good “grid” for publishing noisy histograms. We
have also introduced a new technique for privately selecting of most relevant features for
classification, which enables PrivPfC to scale to higher-dimension datasets. We have con-
ducted extensive experiments on four real datasets, and the results show that our approach
greatly outperforms several other state-of-the-art methods for private data publishing as
well as private classification.
Second, we have improved the state-of-the-art on differentially private k-means cluster-
ing in several ways. We have introduced the EUGkM approach and improved the DPLloyd
method based on a systemized error analysis. Extensive analysis and experimental com-
parison improves the understanding of the effectiveness of algorithms for private k-means
clustering. We have introduced the novel concept of hybrid approach to differentially pri-
vate data analysis, which is so far the best approach to k-means clustering, and may prove
useful in other analysis tasks as well.
Third, we have introduced a new version of SVT that provides better utility. We also
introduce an effective technique to improve the performance of SVT by optimizing the
distribution of privacy budget. These enhancements achieve better utility than the state
of the art SVT and can be applied to improve utility in the interactive setting. We have
also explained the misunderstandings and errors in a number of papers that use or analyze
SVT; and believe that these will help clarify the misunderstandings regarding SVT and help
avoid similar errors in the future. We have also shown that in the non-interactive setting,
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